

Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps

Contributing to America's
Communities

Final Report of the
CSIS Political-Military Studies Project
on the JROTC

Project Director
William J. Taylor Jr.

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Preface

The value and the proper direction of the Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) program have been debated since its inception in 1916. Composed originally of only a handful of units, JROTC is now in almost 3,000 high schools across the country. When new units are added, the same issues tend to be revisited. The basic issue is whether youth education is a proper mission of the U.S. armed forces. Skeptics either assert that JROTC encourages militaristic attitudes among young people or claim that it represents a waste of scarce defense dollars. Proponents see the JROTC program as a proven tool for motivating our nation's youth to achieve personally and develop skills that contribute to the general welfare of their communities and nation.

Our goal in undertaking this project was to provide an objective evaluation of JROTC and to develop useful recommendations for policymakers. We began with the hypothesis that JROTC benefits the students involved and the communities in which they live, but we wanted to let the facts as we uncovered them tell the story. For field research, we went into three different cities and visited several randomly selected JROTC-affiliated schools. What we found was generally positive and sufficient to convince us that our initial suppositions were valid.

This report provides the framework for a reasoned dialogue about JROTC based on data, not rhetoric. We believe that data support the proposition that JROTC provides a sound return on investment. Like most investments, continuing research yields greater, long-term payoffs.

The final version of this report benefited greatly from a conference at the McCormick Estate in Cantigny, Ill., in December 1998. More than 40 specialists with extensive knowledge of JROTC and other programs dedicated to youth development gathered there. They provided many insightful ideas for the future of JROTC. In particular, we thank the Corporation for National Service for the participation of Harris Wofford, Andrew Chambers, and Fred Peters. Many of our ideas for synergies between JROTC and national and community service grew out of discussions with them at steering committee meetings and at Cantigny. We were also honored and pleased that Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera agreed to serve as the keynote speaker at the conference.

We are grateful to the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation for financial support and equally appreciative of the leadership of Neal Creighton and Richard Behrenhausen, who were actively involved in helping us gain access to the people and organizations whose perspectives and data were critical. Richard Friedman of the National Strategy Forum was especially helpful in our research on the flourishing JROTC program in Chicago. The enthusiasm of the political, business, and social leadership of Chicago is nothing less than infectious; Chicago is a model for JROTC.

We are grateful too for the dynamic contributions of recently promoted Colonel Keith Peinhardt, National Guard, who devoted his year as the CSIS National Guard

Visiting Military Fellow primarily to this important project. He and CSIS research assistant Ethan Glick managed this effort as well as any project director could ask. And J. Coleman Kitchen once again did a great job in putting his fine pen to the penultimate draft of this report.

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Executive Summary

Congress established Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) in 1916 with the broad mandate to develop good citizenship and responsibility in young people. The Department of Defense and the army, navy, air force, and marine corps took this mandate and established appropriate missions and objectives. Our benchmark for evaluating JROTC in the United States today was its effectiveness in helping to develop our nation's youth.

Many lament that the pace of change in our society and the demands of making a living place such great stress on the family and fragment focus on nurturing the children we bring into the world. But increasing numbers of citizens have decided to stop lamenting and to join together to do something about the situation. The movement to organize for youth development is clear. Examples abound: The National Guard Youth Challenge program, America's Promise, STARBASE (Science and Technology Academics Reinforcing Basic Aviation and Space Exploration Program). The list has been growing steadily and rapidly. Federal and local governments fund some programs, whereas others are supported by the voluntary efforts of private associations. In one way or another, these organizations all seek to channel the latent energies of our youth away from "hanging out" as individuals or in gangs and toward realizing their potentials for self-improvement and service to others in higher causes directed to the welfare of their communities and their nation.

The oldest and largest public enterprise for youth development is JROTC. Over time it has had its ups and downs, varying with the mood shifts in the United States and its communities and the allocation of scarce defense budget resources by Congress. But today JROTC is alive and well as an institution that promotes good citizenship and responsibility by teaching values and by training our youth to organize and achieve worthwhile objectives together. The U.S. military is the largest, most well-organized "gang" in the United States and it does not "hang out." On the contrary, there is growing awareness these days that our military is underfunded¹ and overstretched. Simultaneously, however, there is a reservoir of energy among our active-duty and reserve forces and retired personnel from both components that is being tapped at federal and local levels for developing our nation's youth. The taps can and should be opened further.

JROTC is clearly a success story, ready to go into its next edition. Like all editions of any good story, it can be improved. This report is a year-long read of JROTC—where it came from, how it has developed to this day, how it can be further improved,

1. Separate statement of Adam Yarmolinsky: "While not conceding that the U.S. military as a whole is 'underfunded' (it is certainly overstretched), I support all the recommendations of the study group and see a bright future for the JROTC in working even more closely with other organizations involved in youth community service."

and why it should be expanded. Our read is not based on anecdotal evidence; rather it is founded on hard data collected through field research.

How good is JROTC? Only as good as those involved say it is—the services that preside over it, the school principals and administrators who manage it, the military teachers–trainers who implement it, and the young people who live it. Their views were checked off in surveys and stated in focus groups. They “told it like it is.” Their views, our independent assessments of various parts of the JROTC program, and our recommendations follow.

In chapter 1 we discuss the context in which JROTC operates today and the organizational structures of the JROTC programs operated by the four individual military services. In chapter 2 we examine the ongoing public debate over the value of JROTC and summarize the findings of some previous research studies of the program. In chapter 3 we present the quantitative and qualitative findings of our own three-city field study of schools in which JROTC operates. In chapter 4 we offer some conclusions and, in chapter 5, a set of recommendations for improving the program.

Chapter 1: Some Facts about JROTC

Much of the information in our discussion of JROTC's current situation is based on talks with personnel in the JROTC headquarters of each of the four services and on the oversight component in DOD. We look closely at the structure and procedures of army, navy, air force, and marine headquarters, examine the nationwide demographic composition of JROTC enrollees, and consider how JROTC deals with such issues as instructor hiring and review, curriculum design, and use of technology.

Chapter 2: Previous Opinions and Research

The overwhelming majority of current commentaries on JROTC reflect preconceived notions (either positive or negative) with little analysis to support the views presented. On the one hand, sympathetic analyses of JROTC tend to be the products of authors who perceive the military as a valuable instrument for building character and good citizenship in our nation's youth. On the other hand, analyses by individuals or organizations clearly predisposed to seeing any military influence on our nation's youth as a threat to democracy are almost invariably negative. Few if any critiques occupy the middle ground.

We also review a number of past research studies on JROTC (ranging from local school systems to nationwide) that for the most part found that students benefit from involvement in JROTC.

Chapter 3: Our Research Findings

We visited three local school systems with JROTC programs of various sizes. In each locale, we examined a sample of schools selected to be representative in terms of geography, demographics, and past performance measures. We talked with principals, guidance counselors, disciplinarians, JROTC instructors, and students themselves. In

addition to carrying out face-to-face interviews and convening focus groups made up of randomly selected students, we asked JROTC students and school officials to fill out and return (anonymously) survey questionnaires (see appendixes B and C). We also collected information from the military's local JROTC offices and from the administrators of the three school systems. Our comparisons between JROTC and non-JROTC student populations were based primarily on these centrally compiled data, because our visits to individual schools focused exclusively on the JROTC program and its enrollees.

In planning our study, we were constrained to some extent by finite resources. We could not, for example, visit and conduct research in a large and truly representative sample of school systems across the nation. JROTC expansion over the past decade has emphasized establishment of new units in urban environments, and we gave these areas priority. This is part of the reason we included the Chicago, Ill., and the Washington, D.C., school systems. We chose El Paso, Tex., for our third study location because of its distinctive demographic characteristics, its reflection of national demographic trends, and its classification as a medium-size city.

The diversity of the El Paso and the Chicago school systems in particular—indicated by such measures as average test scores, demographics, and the socioeconomic situation of the students—convinced us that our conclusions about JROTC were pertinent to the program on the national scale. Although we were not able to visit more affluent school systems, or suburban or rural schools, we were able to include in our Chicago and El Paso samples individual schools whose characteristics we judged to be similar to those of schools in suburban or rural areas.

Although military service mission statements vary somewhat, the overall JROTC mission is to instill good citizenship, responsibility, and leadership in high school students. Our most compelling evidence that it fulfills objectives subsumed by the overall mission comes from surveys and focus-group sessions involving students. We bolstered these observations with concrete measures of student performance, including grade point averages, disciplinary incidents, and attendance. The results from JROTC students were certainly as good as, and generally better than, those of students not enrolled in the program, especially in the later years of high school. In some cases, the differences were statistically significant.

Chapter 4: Conclusions

Our overall finding is that JROTC indeed is beneficial to communities. It strengthens our youth, our communities, and our nation. The program should be steadily expanded and provided with requisite resources. For the armed forces, JROTC's importance lies not in its effect on recruitment, but in its role as a bridge between military and civil society in an era when these two elements tend to diverge. This does not mean (as some of the program's critics claim) that JROTC promotes some sort of "militaristic anti-individualism." On the contrary, JROTC seeks to nurture individualism in the service of a common cause.

Chapter 5: Recommendations

We specifically recommend, as discussed in detail in chapter 5, the following:

- Expansion of JROTC's presence in inner cities remain a priority.
- DOD guarantee that funds for JROTC program management indeed are used for this purpose.
- Reservists and part-time National Guard members be permitted to serve as JROTC instructors.
- Informal coordination between service managers at the national level and between instructors at the regional and local levels be encouraged and expanded.
- Congress take the lead in establishing priorities for the future of JROTC.
- JROTC forge links to nongovernmental organizations involved in youth community service.
- JROTC students be offered incentives to perform nonmilitary as well as military national service.
- JROTC and local school systems cooperatively develop guidelines to ensure that community service activities do not inadvertently undercut other priorities.
- JROTC be sensitive to local concerns relating to education while ensuring that students who want to are able to enroll in JROTC.

Some Facts about JROTC

What JROTC Is

Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) is an elective course taught in nearly 3,000 high schools nationwide by retired military personnel. JROTC training does not incur a military service obligation. Classroom instruction is combined with extra-curricular activities. Goals include enhancing awareness of the rights, responsibilities, and privileges of citizenship; developing each student's sense of personal responsibility; building life skills; and providing leadership opportunities. The four major military services each operate their own JROTC program.¹

Each service maintains a somewhat different focus in its curricula and instruction. Although the army and the marine corps concentrate almost exclusively on the leadership and the citizenship aspects of the JROTC mission, the navy and the air force programs contain extensive instruction in naval science and aerospace science, respectively.

JROTC in Context

The future of a nation resides in its young people. Youth development has a long history as a community activity in the United States, and many organizations, including JROTC, exemplify that spirit. The functions and methods of these groups differ. Some operate in schools, others outside; government supports some, others are privately financed; some have religious affiliations, others are secular. But the intentions are essentially the same: to promote the positive development of the nation's youth.

People often disagree about what positive development means and whose primary responsibility it should be. Yet it is clear that a large number of our youth face significant challenges that can lead to serious legal, social, financial, educational, emotional, and health problems. Although it is not specifically the mission of JROTC to concentrate on the most troubled of our nation's youth, it is helpful to view the program in the context of the overall federal government approach to youth development, which does involve a great effort at supporting youth classified as at-risk. A number of federally supported programs have been established over the years to address this particular concern. A 1997 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on programs for at-risk youth identified over 127 such programs (not including those of the Department of Defense [DOD]) under the aegis of 15 government agencies.² Seven of these agencies

1. Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Using Military Capabilities to Help Young Adults in U.S. Inner-City Areas: A Report by the CSIS Political-Military Studies Program and the National Urban League Joint Study Group* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, March 1997), 19–20.

are funded at less than \$10 million per year and account for only 1 percent of the total expenditures for programs for at-risk youth.

As table 1.1 indicates, the funding of JROTC (amounting to some \$163 million for fiscal year [FY] 1996) was comparatively modest when viewed in this context. Although the mandate of JROTC extends far beyond assisting this sector of our nation's young people, it does contribute, and its resources represent less than 4 percent of the more than \$4.5 billion spent by the federal government for all federal programs that do as well. Indeed, when the cost per young person is considered, the contribution of JROTC seems more impressive still (see table 1.1).

There is no uniformly accepted means of gauging the total contributions of DOD and the individual military services to the mission of youth development. Other than JROTC, only a few military programs can be considered truly national in scope and funding, with the National Guard's Youth Challenge and STARBASE programs the most prominent examples. The remainder of the military's efforts is carried out primarily at the local level. U.S. military base commanders have significant latitude in the expenditure of discretionary funds for youth development. Other programs, such as the Young Marines, rely primarily on private funding.

Table 1.1: Funding of U.S. Government Programs for At-Risk Youth

| Agency | FY 1995 (\$ millions) | FY 1996 (\$ millions) |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Department of Agriculture | 76.2 | 75.6 |
| Corporation for National Service | 117.0 | 114.0 |
| All JROTC Programs | 157.0 | 163.0 |
| Department of Justice | 250.2 | 248.6 |
| Department of Education | 784.5 | 780.7 |
| Department of Health and Human Services | 918.8 | 922.3 |
| Department of Labor | 1,471.2 | 2,215.8 |
| Total | 3,774.9 | 4,520.0 |

Source: General Accounting Office, *At-Risk and Delinquent Youth: Fiscal Year 1996 Programs*; and FY 1999 President's Budget.

Past and Future Growth

JROTC programs are currently operating in high schools in all 54 states and territories. In addition, DOD schools have programs in Japan, Korea, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, American Samoa, the Northern Marianas,

2. General Accounting Office, *At-Risk and Delinquent Youth: Fiscal Year 1996 Programs* (GAO/HEHS-97-21), September 2, 1997.

and the Panama Canal Zone. The 2,587 high schools currently with programs represent approximately 10 percent of U.S. public and private high schools.³

Owing to fluctuations in congressional funding, public interest, and service support for individual programs, the overall growth of JROTC has been uneven and erratic over the past three decades, with annual service growth rates ranging from more than 40 percent in some years to negative values in others.

All four services report that their programs have stopped growing since 1996, and they anticipate no future growth. Indeed, funding problems may create negative growth in years to come.

Demographic Picture

The latest reports provided by DOD indicate that there are currently 924 units in inner-city high schools, representing 36 percent of the total. The five states with the most inner-city units are Texas, California, Florida, Georgia, and Maryland. The relative underrepresentation of such large cities as New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Phoenix, Indianapolis, Boston, Cleveland, Denver, Kansas City, St. Louis, and Columbus, Ohio is a function of the school systems of those cities, which apparently place a lower priority on establishing units. DOD states that at the height of JROTC expansion activity in school year (SY) 1995–1996, all services participated in assisting disadvantaged schools in establishing JROTC units and that enhanced funding was provided to 324 needy schools (13 percent of all units). The investment was estimated to be nearly \$9 million in predominantly inner-city schools.⁴

The JROTC student population has undergone noteworthy compositional shifts over the past few years that are changing the face of JROTC and redefining whom the program serves. To begin, the proportion of female JROTC cadets has been rising steadily over the past few years, from 40.88 percent in SY 1994–1995 to 41.95 percent in 1995–1996, 42.25 percent in 1996–1997, and 43.23 percent in 1997–1998. (By way of comparison, females made up 48 percent of the total high school population in 1995.) This change is even more striking given the fact that total cadet enrollment has risen by more than 70,000 over the past three years. Because none of the services has added new units in the past two years, all the enrollment growth is a result of current units increasing their number of cadets, which shows that JROTC is successful in appealing to young people and communities after units have been established.

The proportion of white JROTC members is relatively low and declining.⁵ Although white students made up 73 percent of the total high school population in 1995, they accounted for only 49.63 percent of JROTC membership in SY 1994–1995, 42.82 percent in 1995–1996, and 41.41 percent in 1996–1997. This decrease has occurred although JROTC stopped expanding into the inner cities in 1995. It is

3. For the most accurate figures for the total number of high schools see U.S. Department of Education, *Schools and Staffing in the U.S.: Selected Data for Public and Private Schools, 1993–1994*.

4. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (FMP), *Expansion of the Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps Program*, October 1996.

5. The following discussion and statistics are based on data from all the services with the exception of the marine corps, which does not break down its cadet figures by race.

probably more a by-product of program location than any other single variable, but we cannot attribute it solely to that factor without detailed demographic analyses.

The enrollment of African American students has held steady since a final annual jump of nearly 8 percentage points at the end of the JROTC expansion era. It went from 25.63 percent of total JROTC enrollment in SY 1994–1995 to 33.21 percent in 1995–1996 and remaining unchanged in 1996–1997 (whereas African Americans made up only 15 percent of the total high school population as of 1995). These numbers suggest that African American students find JROTC an appealing option.

Hispanic JROTC student enrollment has risen slightly in the past few years, from 9.37 percent of the total in SY 1994–1995 to 9.74 percent in 1995–1996 and 10.34 percent in 1996–1997. (Hispanics made up 12 percent of the total high school population in 1995.)

What Happens to JROTC Graduates

Although JROTC is not a military recruiting vehicle, DOD naturally has some interest in knowing how many JROTC students, subsequent to graduating from high school, choose some form of military service. An important source of information is the self-reported data collected from students and then compiled into annual reports by each service. A summary of these reports for two consecutive school years appears in table 1.2. A sizable proportion of the cadets (approximately 40 percent in both years) indicated that they planned some form of military service. Because these data on the propensity of graduates to serve in the military are collected close to the time of their high school graduation, the data can usefully serve as a proxy for actual enlistment rates.⁶ Given the significant recruitment and retention costs that the services currently face and the likelihood that the services will to some degree remain underfunded in the years ahead, this benefit cannot be overlooked. Moreover, given the number of students intending to serve, the total investment by DOD and the services is relatively minor.

Table 1.2 is not a perfect measure of the overall benefits of JROTC to the students and to the country. Graduates who make up the large “other” category include those who intend to go to college, find a job, or do anything other than serve in the military. And, although we can infer that the great majority of these graduates intend to go to college, we cannot determine other values from the data, such as other forms of national service that JROTC graduates might undertake. Nevertheless, it is clear at least that the number of JROTC cadets is on the rise, increasing by approximately 31 percent between SY 1995–1996 and 1996–1997, particularly when it is considered in light of the stabilization of the overall number of JROTC units during the same time period. It is difficult for DOD to ignore such numbers.

6. As demonstrated in Jerald G. Bachman, David R. Segal, Peter Freedman-Doan, and Patrick M. O'Malley, “Does Enlistment Propensity Predict Accessions?” *Armed Forces & Society* 25, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 59–80.

Table 1.2: Where JROTC Graduates Plan to Go after High School

| | Total Disposition of JROTC Graduates of All Services | |
|------------------------------------|---|---------------|
| | SY 1996–1997 | SY 1995–1996 |
| Total Graduates | 30,630 | 23,349 |
| Planning to Attend College | 13,685 45% | 15,132 65% |
| Enlisted Active | 28% | 24% |
| Enlisted National Guard or Reserve | 4% | 7% |
| Military Commission or College | 8% | 12% |
| Other | 60% | 57% |

Source: Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps JROTC Programs' *Disposition of Cadets* reports.

Overall Administrative Structure

The FY 1993 Defense Authorization Act codified the mission statement for JROTC as follows:

It is a purpose of the Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps to instill in students in United States secondary educational institutions the value of citizenship, service to the United States, personal responsibility, and a sense of accomplishment.

DOD provides oversight to all services in the administration of their respective JROTC programs. This supervision is performed from within the Pentagon-based Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy).

Each service has a separate training headquarters element that oversees and administers the JROTC field high school units and reports to DOD. All services link programs in some manner: their junior ROTC programs to their senior ROTC that operates in colleges and universities across the country and acts as a major source of commissioned officers for each service (with the exception of the marine corps, which has no autonomous senior ROTC units). This linkage usually consists of regular inspections by senior units of the junior units. The main control element consists of four small and separate cadres of active military officers and career DOD civilians who administer policy, funding, and program oversight.

School-System Contracts for JROTC

All four services operate their JROTC programs through a series of contracts and agreements between the individual service and the host school systems. The contracts issued by the various services are similar. They are all approximately four to five pages long and legally binding and contain options for cancellation. Key elements offered by DOD to host school systems in these contracts include:

- partial salary payment of service instructors (amounting in most cases to a 50 percent share);
- logistical support for uniforms and equipment;
- reimbursement for administrative expenses and transportation support; and
- curriculum development, books, and lesson plans.

On acceptance of the contract, the school system agrees to:

- hire qualified instructors certified by the individual services as meeting all guidelines and requirements of the program;
- pay part of the salary of service instructors;
- accept the service curriculum;
- provide adequate classroom, storage, and drill field space; and
- comply with the provisions of law and regulations pertaining to the conduct of JROTC programs.

In addition to JROTC, the services offer two other contract options to school systems: a unit in the National Defense Cadet Corps (NDCC) and a program called Career Academy. Both programs differ substantially from each other and from the traditional JROTC.

National Defense Cadet Corps and Career Academies

NDCC is solely an army program (as JROTC was until 1964). It was designed to accommodate schools that wanted JROTC-like programs and could afford to support them from their budgets. Although NDCC units operate in a manner similar to that of JROTC, the school system is required to pay for all curricula, books, uniforms, equipment, and instructor salaries. Because the standard JROTC option is more attractive to (often resource-strapped) school systems, NDCC is currently operating in only five schools. NDCC also suffers from the army's lack of commitment, largely because the school system's control of the purse strings makes it more difficult for the army to have any control over local NDCC units.

Career academies are schools within schools. Known officially as JROTC Career Academies or JROTC Partnership Academies, they are the result of an October 1992 agreement between DOD and the Department of Education to establish military career academies on a joint basis. The academies are modeled on the long-standing high school career academy, and most are in large urban school districts considered particularly in need of an intensive approach. The academy includes the traditional JROTC program as well as several additional military personnel to provide instruction in other school subjects. Vocational and academic curricula are integrated, often in partnership with local businesses; team-teaching techniques and block scheduling are employed. Class sizes are kept relatively small. The army currently supports 30 career academies and 10 partnership academies. Reports from the academies reflect remarkable results but at a cost of substantially more resources provided by all the partners involved.

Improving Instruction

In their own distinct ways, the services are working hard to develop and implement improved educational techniques for JROTC. The navy, for example, has developed a high-tech delivery system that takes advantage of digital technology, whereas the army has developed many cutting-edge presentational methods. All services have established external advisory committees staffed by experts in instructional design. Recent pedagogical improvements have included blocks of instruction devoted to cultural diversity and conflict resolution. Classroom presentations are enriched through the use of such multimedia tools as audiotapes, videos, and hand-held computers. The services provide core curriculum guidance (see below) but allow local instructors to tailor their individual programs to meet local needs as they see them.

JROTC Programs of the Four Services

Army JROTC

The army operates the largest and oldest JROTC program, which has approximately 1,370 units nationwide (the average unit size is approximately 150 cadets). The army program funds 3,400 uniformed instructors, 80 nonuniformed instructors (in the JROTC career academies), 95 personnel at the school district level (47 directors of army instruction and their staffs), and 6 employees of Communities in Schools. The High School Directorate falls under the command and control of the U.S. Army Cadet Command and consists of 2 officers and 24 civilians who are responsible for program management. Regional- and brigade-level staff members amount to fewer than 50.

Key objectives of army JROTC in accordance with the established JROTC mission include

- promoting citizenship,
- developing leadership,
- enhancing communication skills,
- strengthening self-esteem,
- providing the incentive to live drug free,
- encouraging an appreciation of the military services and their accomplishments (with emphasis on the U.S. Army),
- improving physical fitness,
- promoting high school graduation, and
- helping participants learn to work as a team member.

The primary vehicle for attaining these objectives is the program of instruction, which includes components pertaining to each criterion. Major curriculum subject areas include citizenship, leadership, physical education, and communication. The focus is on student-centered participatory learning. State-of-the-art tools are used to

deliver instructional content. The army states that its curriculum is in alignment with three national strategies—the National Education Goals (Goals 2000), the Secretary of Labor's Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills (SCANS), and the President's Summit (America's Promise).

Plans for future improvement of army JROTC include an emphasis on instructor training, collaboration with the other branches of the military and civilian youth development organizations to create synergy and make the best use of limited resources, updating the curriculum, and expansion of student-centered learning. A cornerstone of these plans is performance based instruction (PBI), which focuses on developing skills rather than memorizing facts, encourages a participatory rather than a teacher-centered instructional environment, and visibly ties learning activities to the intended outcome (the student's eventual ability to demonstrate specific skills and knowledge).⁷ The new method of instruction places more emphasis on critical-thinking skills.

Navy JROTC

The naval JROTC (NJROTC) program, with 435 high school units, is the third largest. Established by Public Law 88-647 on October 13, 1964, NJROTC falls under the command and control of the chief of naval education and training (CNET), Pensacola, Fla. The NJROTC program manager has a small headquarters staff located at CNET consisting of 13 full-time military and civilian personnel. Seven regional area managers and seven clerical assistants serve across the country as a closer link to the individual host schools. Total overhead personnel consist of 27 full-time military and civilian employees.

Department of the Navy CNET Instruction 1533.9J dated July 10, 1996, provides written guidance for the program administration. The stated purpose of NJROTC, as stipulated in legislation, is "to instill in students in United States secondary educational institutions the values of citizenship, service to the United States, personal responsibility and a sense of accomplishment."

The supporting objectives outlined in Instruction 1533.9J (e.g., developing informed and responsible citizens, promoting a healthy and drug-free life, encouraging the completion of high school) are similar to those described above in the discussion of army JROTC.

The primary vehicle for attaining these objectives is the navy program of instruction, which includes components pertaining to such topics as leadership, citizenship, drug-abuse prevention, career planning, the past and present navy, nautically relevant aspects of natural science (e.g., meteorology, astronomy, maritime geography, oceanography), first aid, and survival training.⁸ According to navy guidelines, the program offered by each NJROTC unit is to last at least three academic years with 120 hours of instruction per year (72 hours in the classroom and 48 hours of such activities as military drill and athletics). NJROTC's combination of printed classroom materials and multimedia technology (e.g., videodiscs, videocassettes, CD-ROMs, computers) strives for a lively participatory learning environment and has drawn praise from

7. U.S. Army Cadet Command briefing, "Army JROTC Curriculum," April 28, 1997.

8. Department of the Navy, CNET, naval science curriculum documents.

school systems and teachers. Students in many cases find the recorded instruction boring, however.

As the other services do, the navy operates a summer learning program called the Summer Leadership Academy, which offers leadership training, physical-fitness instruction, obstacle courses, field orienteering, sail training, social-etiquette instruction, and other courses that build self-esteem and character.

All NJROTC units include a community-service program that involves students in such activities as drug and alcohol awareness programs, highway and waterway cleanup, tutoring, funeral details, food drives, color guard and ceremonial details, and retirement-home assistance visits. According to the navy, NJROTC high school units averaged over 1,500 hours of community service work during SY 1996–1997.

Air Force JROTC

The air force JROTC (AFJROTC) program, with 609 units worldwide, is the second largest. The AFJROTC program falls under the command and control of the commander of the air education and training command (AETC/CC), Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Ala., where the junior program staff (consisting of 13 military and civilian personnel) is located. The chief of the junior program branch (AFROTC/DOJ) oversees program operations, instructor management, and curriculum and is responsible for overall program content, direction, and coordination.⁹ There is no permanent intermediate staffing structure between AFJROTC headquarters and school units. The senior instructor within each geographical region is designated as regional commander and tasked with coordinating activities between schools and the headquarters level.¹⁰ In addition, selected instructors are designated as area managers who report to the regional commander on the conduct of the program at units within their areas.

The AFJROTC's stated mission is "to educate and train high school cadets in citizenship; promote community service; instill responsibility, character, and self-discipline; and provide instruction in air and space fundamentals."

As in army and navy JROTC, this overall mission is divided into several objectives. They include instilling in high school cadets an understanding of the values of citizenship, a sense of personal responsibility, and a sense of accomplishment. These objectives in turn are intended to lead to respect for democratically constituted authority, appreciation for the traditions of the air force, and willingness to complete high school.

The AFJROTC curriculum is a four-year program divided into two categories—academics (primarily aerospace science) and leadership (e.g., citizenship, self-reliance, and communications skills).¹¹ While providing a core curriculum, AFJROTC also permits local instructors to plan additional teaching suited to local policies and requirements.

9. Air Force Instruction 36-2010, Personnel, Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps, April 27, 1994, pp. 1–2.

10. Air Force Instruction 36-2010 (draft), March 20, 1998, pp. 6–7.

11. U.S. Air Force, *Air Force Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps Curriculum Guide*, June 1997.

In an interview session, the AFJROTC branch chief said that the AFJROTC program was working well and that the air force viewed the program as valuable and providing all the necessary resources for mission accomplishment. (This view is in sharp contrast to the levels of funding and resource support provided by the other three services to their JROTC program operations. See table 1.7 on page 15. The program manager's staff conducts routine surveys of students. The results continue to be positive, as are the results of a recent survey of school principals with AFJROTC programs.

The AFJROTC program also offers two types of summer leadership schools. The Summer Academic Leadership School offers AFJROTC academic credit, whereas the Summer Leadership School awards no academic credit and must be conducted at no cost to AFJROTC.¹²

Current concerns for AFJROTC include procedures in some schools that limit student opportunities to take elective courses, which makes fulfilling minimum, required student enrollment more difficult (a concern also noted by managers of the army program). Keeping the curriculum current is also a challenge, given that only two curriculum developers are assigned to the total development effort. Other concerns include maintaining enough instructors in some schools, budgetary constraints due to program expansion, and cost increases in curriculum materials.¹³

AFJROTC has recently fielded an initiative that may be able to aid curriculum development and cost reduction. Cyber-Campus is a virtual campus that can be accessed by the Military City Online (MCO) area of America Online (AOL), the largest U.S. civilian online service provider. The campus now connects more than 500 of the 609 AFJROTC units to one another, to intermediate regional managers, and to AFJROTC national headquarters. Instructors and students provide instant curriculum feedback and exchange ideas by the hundreds. The potential exists for substantial curriculum-related savings in such areas as administration, postage, and distribution.

Marine Corps JROTC

The marine corps JROTC (MCJROTC) program, with just 174 high school units worldwide, is the smallest of the four service programs. MCJROTC has units in only 39 of the 50 states and none in Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, or the District of Columbia. There is one MCJROTC program in a DOD school in Japan.

The MCJROTC program office falls under the command and control of the director, Training and Education Division, Quantico, Va. The MCJROTC program director maintains a small headquarters staff (three people) to administer the entire national program. MCJROTC has no intermediate staff headquarters (i.e., regional, brigade, or battalion elements to assist in program administration). The support staff is divided into six geographical districts, each of which is assigned one commissioned officer, one noncommissioned officer, and two or three civilians to carry out intermediate-level support functions.

According to Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Order P1533.6C, June 7, 1989, the mission of MCJROTC is "to provide a course in leadership education to

12. U.S. Air Force, *JROTC Program Guide*.

13. Interview with air force JROTC program manager, November 1997.

Table 1.3: Air Force JROTC Instructors: Breakdown by Rank

| Rank | Number | Percentage | Average Age |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| Colonel | 169 | 12.3 | 56 |
| Lieutenant Colonel | 291 | 21.3 | 53 |
| Major | 156 | 11.4 | 47 |
| Captain | 22 | 1.6 | 46 |
| Officer Total | 638 | 46.6 | |
| Chief Master Sergeant | 218 | 15.9 | 53 |
| Senior Master Sergeant | 190 | 13.9 | 51 |
| Master Sergeant | 277 | 20.3 | 48 |
| Technical Sergeant | 41 | 2.9 | 46 |
| Staff Sergeant | 5 | 0.4 | 41 |
| NCO Total | 731 | 53.4 | |
| Total | 1,369 | 100.0 | |

develop informed citizens, strengthen character by teaching of discipline, and develop an understanding of the responsibilities of citizenship.” An MCJROTC training pamphlet states:

MCJROTC is not combat training, nor is it a recruiting program. It is an academic course of instruction which combines the advantages of military leadership training with those of secondary education. The curriculum is designed to develop pride, confidence, self-discipline, and to instill a desire for achievement and self-improvement in the cadets.¹⁴

Instructor Management

All four services screen, certify, and decertify their JROTC instructor forces in similar ways. Each service provides an instructor training program and also requires periodic instructor recertification. Here is one JROTC instructor job description (from the marine corps but similar to others):

The senior marine instructor manages the entire MCJROTC program at his respective school. He functions as a regular faculty member and, in most cases, has the same responsibilities as other teachers and department heads in the school. The uniform is worn in the discharge of his daily duties. The curriculum itself provides citizenship and leadership training, general military subjects, and drill, as well as weapons training and marksmanship. The SMI distributes the teaching

14. U.S. Marine Corps, *Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps Program Pamphlet*, HQ Marine Corps Training Command, Quantico, Va.

Table 1.4: Air Force JROTC Instructors: Education Level

| Degree | Percent Officers | Degree | Percent NCOs |
|-----------|------------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| Bachelors | 100 | 01–30 Semesters Hours | 2.0 |
| Masters | 90 | 31–60 Semesters Hours | 9.0 |
| Doctorate | 2 | 61–90 Semester Hours | 20.0 |
| | | 91+ Semester Hours | 28.0 |
| | | Bachelors | 27.0 |
| | | Masters | 14.0 |
| | | Doctorate | 0.1 |

requirements between the marine instructor(s) and himself. In addition to his teaching duties, the SMI will work with both the school and community in maintaining and strengthening the MCJROTC program.¹⁵

Realistically speaking, despite directives from the services, instructors are primarily responsible to the school principals, who can (and usually do) amend instructor duties to include a laundry list of additional requirements. Most instructors we spoke with welcome these additions because they allow them to become involved with their schools and build better programs. (Only a few instructors we interviewed indicated a desire to limit their extracurricular requirements because of commuting considerations or the need for a second job to supplement income.)

The AFJROTC program provided us with considerable data about the demographics and qualifications of its instructors, as summarized in tables 1.3 and 1.4. Some 69 percent of all AFJROTC instructors (commissioned and noncommissioned officers considered together) have at least a bachelor's degree, and 63 percent of all instructors are rated pilots or navigators. Only 11 percent of the instructors fall below an associate's degree level. The average age of commissioned officers is 51, and the average age of noncommissioned officers is 48. (These average ages suggest that these instructors will probably serve for many more years in their respective school districts and thereby promote stability.) The AFJROTC program currently maintains a certified instructor pool of 1,159 commissioned officers and 976 noncommissioned officers who are prepared to replace retiring instructors or to staff any new units that may be started. Moreover, if cadet enrollment per unit exceeds a certain level, additional instructors may be provided to meet the extra workload.

The army and navy JROTC programs also provided information on their total instructor force, which is contained in tables 1.5 and 1.6. (The marine corps was not able to provide similar statistics on its instructors.) As of February 1998, the navy had 990 instructor positions, 26 of which were vacant. (It is interesting that, despite low levels of instructor vacancies, all services reported occasional difficulty in filling positions in large inner-city schools—a situation we discovered also when we visited some

15. U.S. Marine Corps, *MCJROTC Program Pamphlet*, Quantico, Va.

Table 1.5: Navy JROTC Instructors: Breakdown by Rank

| Rank | Number | Percentage |
|----------------------------|------------|-------------|
| Captain | 93 | 9.4 |
| Commander | 182 | 18.4 |
| Lieutenant Commander | 161 | 16.3 |
| Lieutenant | 25 | 2.5 |
| Chief Warrant Officer | 24 | 2.4 |
| Officer Total | 485 | 49.0 |
| Master Chief Petty Officer | 152 | 15.4 |
| Senior Chief Petty Officer | 154 | 15.5 |
| Chief Petty Officer | 141 | 14.2 |
| Petty Officer First Class | 32 | 3.2 |
| NCO Total | 479 | 48.3 |
| Vacancies | 26 | 2.6 |

of those schools.) Commissioned officers occupy some 49 percent of the NJROTC instructor positions. All of them have at least an undergraduate degree (many were educated in the physical sciences) and are required to have had some prior experience as an academic instructor. Noncommissioned officers, all of whom have at least some postsecondary education, fill another 48 percent of the slots. All services put instructors through a rigorous screening and certification process.

All services certify instructors and, on rare occasions when such action is warranted, decertify them. They also maintain fairly large pools of certified instructors to replace retiring instructors or to be placed in new programs.

The overall JROTC instructor force is a sound and highly capable body of professional soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Most are seasoned by years of leadership responsibility and have done well in their primary occupations.

Funding

JROTC funding continues to be controversial. Recent funding data for the separate service components are summarized in table 1. 7.

During the past five years, the overall average amount spent per cadet has generally declined. Given external pressures to provide better programs, the increase in student enrollment, and duplicating functions in the four service headquarters, there appears to be a widening gap between mission and resources. All service JROTC program headquarters have staff to improve curriculum content and support materials, instructor training, and educational technology. The programs do well with what they have

Table 1.6: Army JROTC Instructors: Breakdown by Rank

| Rank | Number | Percentage |
|--------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Colonel | 149 | 4.2 |
| Lieutenant Colonel | 670 | 18.8 |
| Major | 507 | 14.3 |
| Captain | 56 | 1.6 |
| Warrant Officer | 73 | 2.1 |
| Officer Total | 1,455 | 40.9 |
| Sergeant Major | 543 | 15.3 |
| Master Sergeant/First Sergeant | 902 | 25.4 |
| Sergeant First Class | 542 | 15.2 |
| Staff Sergeant | 42 | 1.2 |
| NCO Total | 2,029 | 57.0 |
| Vacancies | 72 | 2.0 |

but will require more coordination or more funding to remain competitive and cutting edge. Also, the number of units remains static even as cadet enrollment continues to climb at a steady pace—something that entails additional instructor requirements and cost and places stress on existing systems. All the services have stated that they can drive forward in some areas of JROTC but only at the expense of others.

Because of the massive pressure on current and future DOD budgets, the long-term funding picture appears even more austere. Historically, funding reductions have been passed downward and all subordinate services and organizations have taken their share of the cuts. These strains will become more severe as the federal government continues its efforts at fiscal restraint. JROTC is currently at the mercy of training command budgets that continue to dwindle. Future survival, improvement, and any expansion will require considerable congressional support and some innovative solution that represent permanent change. (See chapters 4 and 5 for conclusions and recommendations.)

Table 1.7: JROTC Funding

| Service Program | FY 1995 | FY 1996 | FY 1997 | FY 1998 | FY 1999 |
|---------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Army JROTC | | | | | |
| Appropriations (\$ millions) | 84.619 | 83.039 | 86.741 | 87.549 | 87.503 |
| Average Cadet Enrollment | 167,534 | 204,821 | 206,774 | 198,637 | 198,748 |
| Investment per Cadet (\$) | 505 | 405 | 419 | 441 | 440 |
| Navy JROTC | | | | | |
| Appropriations (\$ millions) | 33.327 | 34.553 | 32.358 | 30.518 | 30.581 |
| Average Cadet Enrollment | 51,445 | 52,774 | 59,757 | 63,342 | 58,994 |
| Investment per Cadet (\$) | 648 | 655 | 541 | 482 | 518 |
| Marine Corps JROTC | | | | | |
| Appropriations (\$ millions) | 9.537 | 14.167 | 12.005 | 12.016 | 12.385 |
| Average Cadet Enrollment | 16,864 | 16,801 | 21,924 | 22,446 | 22,968 |
| Investment per Cadet (\$) | 566 | 843 | 548 | 535 | 539 |
| Air Force JROTC | | | | | |
| Appropriations (\$ millions) | 29.902 | 32.023 | 33.122 | 34.182 | 36.007 |
| Average Cadet Enrollment | 67,802 | 82,294 | 91,284 | 95,849 | 100,642 |
| Investment per Cadet (\$) | 441 | 389 | 363 | 357 | 358 |
| JROTC Totals (All Services) | | | | | |
| Appropriations (\$ millions) | 157.385 | 163.782 | 164.226 | 164.265 | 166.476 |
| Average Cadet Enrollment | 303,645 | 356,690 | 379,739 | 380,274 | 381,352 |
| Investment per Cadet (\$) | 518 | 459 | 432 | 432 | 437 |

Note. Some figures for periods after FY 1996 are estimates.

Source. Department of Defense, OASD /FMP/MPP/AP, April 13, 1998; and FY 1999 *President's Budget*.

Previous Opinions and Research

Public opinion of JROTC in public schools falls into two sharply different camps. People tend either to oppose JROTC's presence in high schools vigorously, accusing it of encouraging militaristic attitudes among the nation's youth, or to love it. The latter group is composed mainly of those who have had direct exposure to JROTC, associating with young people who have gone through the program and seeing firsthand the positive results of the experience, or at least seeing a unit in operation in a local community. Both camps are short on objective analyses and long on emotion.

Favorable Assessments

One of the most eloquent affirmations of the worth of JROTC appears in retired General Colin Powell's book, *My American Journey*:

After Desert Storm, the American people at long last were again proud of their military, and I wanted to use this momentum to help high school youths, particularly those in troubled inner cities, by increasing the number of Junior ROTC programs. Under Junior ROTC, active-duty NCOs, but mostly retired officers and noncoms teach such high school courses as citizenship, leadership, and military history. They drill the students and take them on map reading exercises and field trips.

In the spring of 1992, I called in the Joint Staff personnel officer, Brigadier General Mary Willis, and told her, "I want a plan for increasing Junior ROTC on my desk in ten days." In a week, General Willis had a proposal to take us from 1,500 to 2,900 high schools. The Service chiefs bought into it. Secretary Cheney and President Bush backed the plan. And after Sam Nunn got behind the bill in the Senate, we wound up with approval for funding Junior ROTC in 3,500 high schools.

Yet, ironically, while we had a flock of programs in states with large rural areas, like Texas, we continued to meet resistance in certain urban areas. Liberal school administrators and teachers claimed that we were trying to "militarize" education. Yes, I'll admit, the armed forces might get a youngster more inclined to enlist as a result of Junior ROTC. But society got a far greater payoff. Inner-city kids, many from broken homes, found stability and role models in Junior ROTC. They got a taste of discipline, the work ethic, and they experienced pride of membership in something healthier than a gang. Until 1993, there were still *no* Junior ROTC programs in any public school in New York City and only one private school

offered the program. Finally, we broke through. Seven New York City schools presently have Junior ROTC programs, including my alma mater, Morris High School. College-level ROTC quite literally made my life. The junior program can provide a fresh start in life for thousands of endangered kids, particularly those from minorities living in crime-plagued ghettos. Junior ROTC is a social bargain.¹⁶

A grateful JROTC member's perspective is conveyed in a letter to Secretary of Defense William Perry:

My name is Wes Livingston and I am a student at Austin High School in Decatur, Ala. I am a cadet major in JROTC and the battalion commander. This is the second year Austin High has had a JROTC program, and we already have over one hundred cadets. The program is a great success. It teaches discipline and leadership to everyone involved. Our SAI [senior army instructor], Lieutenant Colonel James Walker, inspires his students to do their very best, so consequently most people's grades have improved. We now have a drill team, PT team, rifle team, and color guard. The members of these groups have bonded together like families, and each person helps the others. Students who might have dropped out of school altogether, now look forward to school to have their JROTC class.

The opportunities for senior ROTC scholarships are wonderful. A student from last year received a full tuition scholarship to college this year. Without it, he probably would not have been able to go to college at all. I would like to thank the army for having this program offered in high school. Any money spent on JROTC is an investment, and the United States will receive the benefits years from now as its citizens are better educated and further prepared to face the challenges of the future.¹⁷

The respect for JROTC on the part of some members of Congress is reflected in the following excerpt from a letter by U.S. Representative Saxby Chambliss, Eighth District, Ga.

The Army Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps has established a reputation of excellence, in its members and the services they provide. This commitment to superiority has been recognized by the young men and women, educators and administrators at Twiggs County Comprehensive High/Middle School in Jeffersonville, Ga. I am requesting on their behalf that you consider this school for eligibility in your JROTC program.... Be assured that this initiative would have the full support of the students, school administration, community, and this congressional office.¹⁸

16. Colin L. Powell (with Joseph E. Persico), *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 555–556. Reprinted with permission from Random House.

17. Wes Livingston (Cadet Major, Army JROTC), letter to Secretary of Defense William Perry, September 25, 1996.

18. Saxby Chambliss, U.S. Representative, letter to Major General Morris Boyd, Chief Legislative Liaison, U.S. Army, January 27, 1997.

Flora Brooks Boyd, director of the Department of Juvenile Justice, S.C., attests to JROTC's relevance to at-risk youth:

The JROTC program is an integral part of our efforts to help troubled young people to change their attitudes and behavior. The results thus far have been amazing, and we look forward to continuing success in the future.¹⁹

Research Studies

A review of previous research yielded several studies (ranging from local school systems to the nation) suggesting that students benefited from involvement in JROTC.

Studies by the Armed Services

The management components of the services have themselves acknowledged difficulty in effectively demonstrating the success of JROTC in fulfilling its stated mission. In the words of the U.S. Army Cadet Command,

The army, through its executive agency, U.S. Army Cadet Command, collects data concerning cadet performance each year. However, some objectives, such as promoting citizenship, are not readily measurable. Accordingly, some evidence of program effectiveness is testimonial and anecdotal: teachers, school officials, parents and cadets themselves attest to the positive difference that JROTC has made for individual cadets, the school, and the community. Comparison is made to statistics reported from the same schools hosting JROTC programs. Comparison to national norms is not appropriate since so many JROTC programs are targeted toward at-risk youth.²⁰

Key performance measures indicate that army JROTC cadets are more self-disciplined, attend class more frequently, are less likely to drop out of school, and (in the case of high school seniors) are more likely to graduate. Some specifics:

- Disciplinary infractions: 5.18 percent of JROTC members vs. 13.94 percent of the overall school population;
- Attendance: 84.2 percent vs. 74 percent;
- Graduation: 94 percent vs. 89.4 percent.

Army cadets performed better than the overall school population in every area that is routinely measured by educators, including academic performance: grade point average (GPA) 2.68 vs. 2.57; scholastic aptitude test (SAT) 901.2 vs. 865; American college test (ACT) 25.24 vs. 24.²¹

19. Flora Brooks Boyd, Department of Juvenile Justice, South Carolina, letter to Major General Stewart Wallace, Commanding General, U.S. Army Cadet Command, October 16, 1997.

20. U.S. Army Cadet Command, "Army Junior ROTC (JROTC) Fact Sheet" (ATCC-HS/4306), May 19, 1998.

21. Ibid.

In June 1992, the Naval Training Systems Center, Orlando, Fla., published an evaluation of the benefits of NJROTC to the navy, the secondary-school system, and the cadet students. This benefits analysis was ordered by the commander of CNET in view of the need to emphasize cost-effectiveness given the shrinking resources available to the navy. Data were gathered through surveys, interviews, and other means from 38 NJROTC units selected as a representative sample of the 228 units then in operation.

The report's conclusions included the following:

- The NJROTC program provides an opportunity for skill development.
- The program establishes a constructive environment for growth and development.
- For many, the NJROTC program provides a positive alternative and a place to belong.
- Regardless of peer pressure, the cadets are satisfied with their experience and willingly participate.
- The availability of the program appears to be a factor in the decision of many cadets to remain in school.
- The community, school, cadets, and the parents of cadets strongly endorse and support the program.

A total of 126 academic instructors in the host schools took part in a survey asking them how JROTC cadets compared with the overall school population in several areas of character and performance. Majorities of these instructors rated the cadets as much better in such categories as respect for authority (71.4 percent), behavior (66.7 percent), appearance (67.5 percent), self-respect (59.5 percent), and self-discipline (61.1 percent).

The report also recommended the following:

- Routine assessment of cadets and NJROTC units to determine changes in perceptions and attitudes regarding the program and to evaluate trends.
- A longitudinal study of graduating senior cadets to assess how the program affects cadets after graduation. Tracking seniors after graduation would document the number of JROTC cadets who enter the military as well as provide the capability of comparing their performance in the military with the performance of non-JROTC enlistees.
- A standard measure (i.e., person-hours) of time spent in community service and establishment of volunteerism. This would document time spent helping the community and the host school.²²

Civilian Studies

A 1973 study by Richard Seiverling compared mean scores of Pennsylvania JROTC cadets enrolled in the senior class with those of students at a similar class level who did

22. U.S. Naval Training Systems Center, *Benefits Analysis of the Naval Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps* (Technical Report 92-015), June 1992.

not pursue a similar course of study. The JROTC cadets were found to have higher mean scores than the students not enrolled in JROTC, but the difference was not statistically significant.²³

In a 1984 analytical paper on the perceived value of JROTC, results from a series of personal interviews were reported. In the paper it was stated that school systems have historically ignored many of the direct benefits of the JROTC curriculum and concluded that JROTC was relatively inexpensive from the standpoint of the school system compared with other in-school programs such as band and football.²⁴

A 1984 study by James Harrile found that 160 principals of host high schools in the midwestern United States had a favorable attitude toward the JROTC program, identifying the following specific benefits of participation: improved self-esteem, provision of a source of identification, and growth of patriotism and leadership ability. The study also showed that JROTC served the community by acting as a bridge between the school and the community.²⁵

In 1985, the district program evaluator of the public school system in Albuquerque, N.Mex., conducted a comprehensive and well-designed evaluation of JROTC programs. The evaluation included surveys and interviews. It concluded that school administrators strongly supported the program and that the program provided value to the Albuquerque school system.²⁶

A 1990 study (using representative samples from the U.S. East Coast) concluded that cadets were more responsible citizens and had a greater appreciation of integrity and responsibility and a positive response to constituted authority. More than 90 percent of cadets surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that JROTC had given them the ethical values that underlie good citizenship. The study found a positive relationship between completion of JROTC and job opportunities. According to data initially gathered for Operation Capital from the senior class in the Washington, D.C., public schools in the 1987–1988 school year, 94 percent of cadets graduated compared with 75 percent for all seniors. Teachers and administrators unanimously said that the JROTC program enhanced school curriculum.²⁷

In a 1991 study, army JROTC senior cadets were compared with non-JROTC seniors in six public secondary schools in Washoe County School District, Nev. Standard measurement techniques were used to determine the extent to which JROTC was associated with improved scores in the areas of leadership, citizenship, and self-reliance. Statistically significant differences between the JROTC and non-JROTC groups

23. Richard F. Seiverling, "A Study to Measure the Effectiveness of Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) Programs in Pennsylvania's Public Secondary Schools." Ed.D. diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1973.

24. Christopher Arthur Bogden, "The Perceived Value of JROTC." (Analytical paper presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, 1984).

25. James Bryant Harrile, "Attitudes Held by Host Principals Toward Army JROTC in the Third Region." Ph.D. diss., University of Northern Colorado, 1984.

26. Prestina Sanchez-Davis, *A Review of High School ROTC Programs in the Albuquerque Public Schools* (Albuquerque Public Schools, April 1985).

27. Janet Carruthers-Day, J. Middleton, and P. Wolfley, "A Study of JROTC: A Comparison of JROTC Cadets with High School Seniors." Master's thesis, Webster University, 1990.

were found in all three areas. The study concluded that army JROTC had indeed improved the lives of thousands of young people.²⁸

In April 1998, Summit Consulting completed a study of JROTC programs in the public high school system of St. Paul, Minn. That study focused on participant satisfaction; results in the areas of achievement, attendance, and behavior; and analysis of JROTC curriculum relative to school district priorities. Its findings included the following:

- Of the 358 students currently enrolled in the JROTC programs surveyed, 70 percent rated the JROTC program better than their other classes and 94 percent said that the program had met or exceeded their expectations. Students of both genders and across all racial and ethnic groups were very pleased with the JROTC program and believed that positive changes in attendance, discipline, and grades were directly related to their participation in JROTC. They stated that the most positive aspects of the program were its development of leadership skills, teamwork, self-discipline, and self-confidence. The negative aspects were such regulations as hair length and wearing uniforms.
- The programs were staffed by retired military officers who were highly qualified in their areas of expertise and who appeared to have positive attitudes toward their jobs, the programs, and the young people with whom they work.
- All four of the programs chosen for on-site examination were strongly endorsed by the principals and most staff members in the schools. They believed that the programs were good not only for the cadets but also for the school as a whole.
- The curricula of all four program emphasized strongly the development of leadership and qualities of personal motivation and self-esteem.²⁹

Negative Opinions

The CSIS study group also located documents written by organizations arguing that JROTC is not in the best interest of students and that the military should not be involved in the public schools. These groups include the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors (CCCO), the Center for Defense Information (CDI), Women Against Military Madness (WAMM), Veterans for Peace (VP), the Committee Opposed to Militarism and the Draft (COMD), the War Resisters League, the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), and the Project on Youth and Non-Military Opportunities (Project YANO).

Literature expressing opposition to JROTC in public schools includes printed reports, newspaper articles, and Web pages. Much of this material actively promotes

28. William E. Roberts, "Leadership, Citizenship and Self-Reliance: A Comparison of Army JROTC High School Senior Cadets and Non-JROTC High School Seniors." Ph.D. diss., University of San Francisco, December 1991.

29. Summit Consulting, Review of JROTC Programs in Saint Paul Public High Schools (Executive Summary), April 1998.

anti-JROTC community activism, sometimes offering kits, training sessions, and other assistance to local school officials and citizens seeking to shut down JROTC programs. Some examples:

- CCCO maintains a robust Web site clearly stating that JROTC in high schools should be stopped because it is wasting tens of thousands of dollars that could be used for better purposes. The site sharply criticizes JROTC textbooks and argues that JROTC betrays the principle of local control of schools. The site offers a “military out of our schools” kit and a toll-free telephone number for additional information and assistance.³⁰
- The San Francisco office of GLAAD has published a Web-based document calling for the elimination of “paramilitary” JROTC programs. Some excerpts:

U.S. military policy...denies basic civil rights to lesbians and gays...In effect, by allowing the JROTC to continue, the school district willingly invites homophobic bigotry directly into our classrooms...

...JROTC programs across the nation utilize a systematic process of intimidation. A “code of silence” surrounds children in the program, who have only reluctantly begun to report numerous instances of “hazing” and other brutality that are JROTC hallmarks...

...The bottom line is that JROTC textbooks teach hate and violence to our city's children.³¹

A COMD newsletter article available on the Web asserts that, when 5,000 San Diego teachers went on strike in February 1996, all 21 JROTC instructors crossed picket lines at the school district's 10 schools with JROTC units, although the teachers' union (which also represented the instructors) had earlier refrained from public criticism of JROTC to avoid advocating termination of the jobs of the JROTC instructors. The article went on to accuse “the retired military officers who teach JROTC” of

...pos[ing] an even greater, long-term danger [because in each of this country's JROTC units] these individuals are teaching their anti-labor philosophy and values to a hundred or more students, and those students are influencing others...

With lessons like these being taught in a growing number of public schools, one has to wonder how much longer there will even be unions or collective bargaining in the U.S.³²

- The AFSC maintains a comprehensive Web site, in which one section, “Does JROTC Belong in Our Schools?” accuses JROTC of

30. CCCO <<http://www.libertynet.org/ccco/index.html>>.

31. GLAAD <<http://www.glaad.org/glaad/9506/san-francisco.html>>.

32. Rick Jahnkow, “JROTC Teachers Bring Military's Strike-Breaking Role into Schools,” Committee Opposed to Militarism and the Draft, March–April 1996 <<http://www.afsc.org/youthmil/html/issues/schools/jrostrikt.htm>>.

- making invalidated claims that it improves student performance;
- undercutting school antiviolence programs by offering rifle marksmanship training;
- imposing expensive cost-sharing requirements that drain money from other school programs;
- using texts of questionable quality;
- imposing military-mandated standards of physical fitness, appearance, and sexual orientation as a condition of instructor employment;
- employing few women instructors;
- offering a rote curriculum that fails to develop critical-thinking skills; and
- employing instructors with inadequate credentials who are often un-unionized.³³

Catherine Lutz and Lesley Bartlett set forth this perspective in more detail in a 40-page 1995 AFSC research report. They state that, although many JROTC personnel clearly want to serve youth, DOD's goals of defending its budget, helping its veterans find employment, and garnering new recruits are not consistent with the mission of positive youth development. They deny that there is evidence that the program reduces dropout rates, increases the knowledge or analytical skills of those that participate, or prevents drug abuse. They accuse JROTC of encouraging students (particularly women and minorities) to rely uncritically on the military as a source of self-esteem, guidance, and opportunity.³⁴

- Eugene J. Carroll Jr., a retired rear admiral and the deputy director of the Center for Defense Information, condemned JROTC in a June 26, 1993, *New York Times* op-ed piece. He questioned the program's methods and purpose (which he suggested was to encourage positive attitudes toward military service among the young, thus creating a storehouse of potential recruits).³⁵

33. American Friends Service Committee, "Does JROTC Belong in Our Schools?" <<http://www.afsc.org/youthmil/y&mflyer.htm>>, March 1997.

34. Catherine Lutz and Lesley Bartlett, *Making Soldiers in the Public Schools: An Analysis of the Army JROTC Curriculum* (American Friends Service Committee, 1995).

35. Eugene J. Carroll Jr., "Junior ROTC? Who Needs It?" *New York Times*, June 26, 1993.

Our Research Findings

Our field research was carried out between November 1997 and April 1998 at 28 JROTC units in Chicago, Ill., Washington, D.C., and El Paso, Tex. This research involved personal interviews and written surveys with more than 150 school officials, including principals, assistant principals, deans of students, academic counselors, security personnel, teachers, and JROTC instructors. In addition, more than 2,000 students completed written questionnaires or participated in focus-group discussions exploring their thoughts, feelings, and experiences relating to JROTC.

The schools we visited were selected because of their socioeconomic diversity. Chicago was chosen as a study site because of its heavy concentration of JROTC units and its robust ethnic mix; Washington, D.C., because of the demanding environment in which its JROTC units operate; and El Paso because of its Hispanic population and its border location. It also ideally represents the type of medium-sized city targeted for JROTC growth during the expansion of the mid-1990s.

Chicago, Illinois

Background

The bulk of our field research was conducted in the Chicago Public School System (CPS). The third largest school system in the country, CPS contains some 553 schools (of which 75 are high schools). Its approximately 412,000 students are drawn from a diverse city that celebrates ethnic culture, arts, and entertainment. Although most school systems would claim to place high priority on improving classroom performance and overall education, Chicago has been nationally recognized in recent years for such efforts. Some 35,000 selected students attend 36 magnet high schools offering specialized educational programs.

The 75 high schools in CPS have 40 JROTC units (33 army, 4 navy, 1 air force, and 2 marine units). For FY 1997, DOD per student expenditure in the city's JROTC units was \$374,³⁶ a rate somewhat lower than the corresponding national figure of \$432.³⁷ As is the case for most large urban school systems with multiple JROTC units, there is a small headquarters at the CPS central administration. Chicago's is known as the Directorate of Army Instruction (DAI).

The city's involvement with JROTC dates back almost to the program's inception. The JROTC unit at Lane Technical High School was formed in 1917; the size of the

36. This figure was provided by the Chicago Directorate of Army Instruction.

37. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management Policy (FMP)/Manpower and Personnel Policy (MPP)/Accession Policy (AP), April 13, 1998.

initial cadet class was more than 1,500 because membership was mandatory in the all-male school.

Demographic Analysis

DAI reports statistics for the 33 army JROTC units directly to the army program, whereas information from the other JROTC units goes directly to their respective services, with the DAI used for liaison to CPS and for logistic support.

In SY 1997–1998, 59 percent of the 6,826 enrollees in the city’s 33 army JROTC units were female (compared with 54 percent of the total student population of 50,656 in these 33 high schools). The top JROTC leadership positions (cadet battalion commanders and battalion executive officers) were also predominantly occupied by females, many of them African American and Hispanic. According to our focus-group discussions, many female cadets relished these roles and were selected for their positions of authority because they were good leaders (perhaps because they had better interpersonal skills and more mature attitudes toward the pursuit of long-term goals than their male counterparts). Several JROTC instructors echoed this belief. Some instructors also stated that female cadets seemed less influenced by peer pressure not to join JROTC or pursue leadership positions, and that males generally were more apathetic about becoming involved with JROTC because of requirements relating to personal grooming and wearing uniforms.

One particularly noteworthy implication of the demographic data in tables 3.1 and 3.2 is that African American females make up a sharply higher percentage of JROTC membership than they do the general enrollment in Chicago’s army JROTC schools (37 percent vs. 29 percent). It is reasonable to wonder whether members of this group are particularly drawn to JROTC because of their environmental or cultural characteristics.

Table 3.1: CPS Schools with Army JROTC Units (overall student body)

| | Male | | Female | | Total |
|------------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|---------------|
| White | 2,658 | 5.0% | 2,457 | 5.0% | 5,115 |
| African American | 11,651 | 23.0% | 14,562 | 29.0% | 26,183 |
| Hispanic | 7,931 | 16.0% | 9,627 | 19.0% | 17,558 |
| Asian American | 743 | 1.0% | 793 | 2.0% | 1,536 |
| Other | 128 | 0.3% | 136 | 0.3% | 264 |
| | | | | | 50,656 |

Table 3.2: CPS Schools with Army JROTC Units (JROTC enrollment)

| | Male | | Female | | Total |
|------------------|-------|-------|--------|-------|--------------|
| White | 260 | 4.0% | 249 | 4.0% | 509 |
| African American | 1,604 | 23.0% | 2,503 | 37.0% | 4,107 |
| Hispanic | 887 | 13.0% | 1,190 | 17.0% | 2,077 |
| Asian American | 51 | 1.0% | 43 | 1.0% | 94 |
| Other | 20 | 0.3% | 19 | 0.3% | 39 |
| | | | | | 6,826 |

Quantitative Measures of Effectiveness

DAI Data. The DAI made the following statements about Chicago's 33 army JROTC units for SY 1996–1997:

- JROTC students had a lower dropout rate than the school rate in 30 of 33 schools (91 percent).
- JROTC students had a lower or equal suspension rate than the school rate in 29 of 31 schools (94 percent).³⁸
- JROTC students had a higher or equal graduation rate than the school rate in 27 of 33 schools (82 percent).
- JROTC seniors had a higher or equal grade point average than the school average in 32 of 33 schools (97 percent).
- JROTC seniors had a higher or equal ACT score than the school score in 33 of the 33 schools (100 percent).

CPS Data. CPS was exceptionally helpful in providing this study with detailed quantitative data on JROTC and non-JROTC students in 16 of the 18 schools we visited during our field research. The school system data cover SY 1993–1994, 1994–1995, 1995–1996, and 1996–1997 and include such items as grade point averages (GPAs), cumulative absences, and graduation rates.³⁹

We followed the progress across time of a single generation (cohort) each of JROTC and non-JROTC students by examining data on SY 1993–1994 freshmen, 1994–1995 sophomores, 1995–1996 juniors, and 1996–1997 seniors. We used GPA and absences as quantitative measures of possible differences between the JROTC and non-JROTC cohorts. See table 3.3.

In SY 1993–1994 (the cohorts' freshman year), the JROTC average GPA was actually lower than that of nonmembers, and this difference was statistically

38. Two schools were unable to supply suspension data for their total student populations.


39. Two schools among those we visited, including Chicago's only air force unit, had not yet been established at the beginning of this period.

Table 3.3: Chicago JROTC vs. Non-JROTC Cohorts

| | 1993–1994 | 1994–1995 | 1995–1996 | 1996–1997 |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| JROTC Students | 955 | 610 | 456 | 300 |
| Average GPA | 1.63 | 2.05 | 2.34 | 2.59 |
| Average Absences | 21.06 | 15.06 | 13.51 | 11.44 |
| Non-JROTC Students | 7712 | 6674 | 4705 | 3794 |
| Average GPA | 1.75 | 1.97 | 2.33 | 2.57 |
| Average Absences | 18.74 | 15.94 | 13.08 | 11.17 |

significant.⁴⁰ (We might surmise that some JROTC freshmen were motivated in part to join JROTC to improve their academic performance.)


In 1994–1995 (the cohorts' sophomore year), however, the average GPA for JROTC members was higher than that of nonmembers (perhaps because of the better attendance and discipline among JROTC members) with the difference being statistically significant. During their junior and senior years, the JROTC member's average GPA was slightly higher, but the differences from the corresponding nonmember averages were not statistically significant in these two years. See figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Average GPA: Chicago JROTC vs. Non-JROTC Cohorts

In their freshman year, the average number of absences was higher for JROTC members than for nonmembers, with the difference being statistically significant. None of the differences for subsequent years is statistically significant. Absences for both groups decreased markedly after the freshman year. See figure 3.2.

40. Differences in GPAs were evaluated for statistical significance by the Student's-t test with the critical region of size 0.05.

Figure 3.2: Average Absences (cumulative through second semester): Chicago JROTC vs. Non-JROTC Cohorts



We examined graduation rates for seniors in the Chicago sample schools in 1994 through 1997. There were no statistically significant differences between JROTC members and nonmembers.⁴¹

In sum, within a population that can be classified as having significantly higher numbers of at-risk students than the norm nationally, sustained membership in JROTC over several years pays off. Classroom performance and other objective measures of behavior at school reach to or beyond the average in individual schools.

Local Opinions on JROTC Effectiveness

School Personnel. In soliciting feedback from local school leadership in each city we visited, we explored some basic issues that must be addressed in any strategic assessment of JROTC. The perspectives of those that deal on a daily basis with the program and have seen its benefits to the schools are crucial to gaining a thorough understanding of the program's operation. In some cases, the feedback came through questionnaires that the recipients filled out and returned to us anonymously. In other cases, interviews allowed us to expand on important topics.

We found Chicago-area school principals to be knowledgeable and thoughtful about JROTC. With one exception (a single vote for fair among their responses to the instructors' abilities item in figure 3.3), 19 principals rated JROTC as good or excellent in the areas listed in figure 3.3.


Suggestions by the principals for improving JROTC's utility to students, the schools, and the community included

- making JROTC participation mandatory during the junior and the senior years,
- offering more field trips and extracurricular activities,

41. The chi-square test of independence was used to evaluate differences in graduation rates.

- requiring more service of cadets,
- increasing JROTC participation in annual school parades and ceremonies,
- having more competition between JROTC units at different schools,
- improving facilities (especially indoor drill facilities),
- adding instructors,
- encouraging instructors to continue their own education, and
- encouraging each JROTC member in the upper grades to mentor a freshman.

Figure 3.3: Chicago Principals' Ratings of JROTC Qualities



Both principals and school counselors repeatedly praised JROTC membership as promoting self-discipline and motivation. One counselor said that “many JROTC kids have no family ties [and are] wards of the state, with no male role model; JROTC is their family.” Another counselor, from a school with a high number of student pregnancies, claimed that “fewer female students who participate in JROTC become pregnant.” Other comments by counselors included references to amazing turn-arounds, increased confidence, and great enthusiasm. Many suggested that the process of going through JROTC inspections led to “more pride in their appearance and in their school work.”


Those responsible for discipline in the schools agreed that JROTC was a source of self-discipline. Students enrolled in JROTC for at least one year “are rarely seen by the assistant principal.” The few JROTC members that appear in the discipline office are usually sent there for relatively minor offenses such as “tardiness or not following through on teachers’ instructions.”

Of the 28 Chicago JROTC instructors we surveyed (see appendix B), most of them rated the aspects of the program listed in figure 3.4 as either good or excellent.

When instructors were asked about the value of JROTC to students, their responses were strongly positive, for example,

[It] provides a base for values, integrity, self-esteem, and teamwork that will affect them all their lives. ~ Younger cadets tend to make more positive decisions [while] older students tend to assume leadership roles.... All benefit by applying the JROTC disciplines in their other classes. ~ I see a difference in the way they carry themselves.

Figure 3.4: Chicago Instructors' Ratings of Program Success



JROTC instructors were also emphatic about the program's value to the schools:

We work with teachers and administrators to help students. Cadets demonstrate a higher...standard, which influences other students. ~ [Cadets] are always the first ones asked when volunteers are needed for school functions. ~ JROTC was singled out by the state of Illinois [yearly inspection] as one of the few areas that should be replicated.

and to the community:

We provide color guards...ushers at civic events. ~ Their excellence is known in the community. ~ High community partner involvement, very favorable responses to student internships.

A number of those questioned said that additional personnel support would be helpful to the JROTC program.

Students. We carried out opinion sampling (field surveys) of JROTC members in the three cities we visited; the results are in appendix C. Some highlights of the Chi-

ago survey (most of the percentages in the other two cities were roughly comparable) follow:

- Most of those in JROTC planned to remain in the program in the following school year (84 percent).
- JROTC members wish to participate in after-school and weekend JROTC group events (73 percent) and would recommend JROTC to a close friend (86 percent).
- JROTC members are goals oriented with 90 percent planning to take college courses and 98 percent expecting to obtain a high school diploma.

In addition to collecting survey data, we conducted a number of focus-group sessions with Chicago JROTC cadets that provided considerable insight into their attitudes toward the program.

When the students were asked why they joined JROTC, their responses included interest in the military, the fact that the program was required (in some cases), and the fact that JROTC could be taken in place of physical education. (It is interesting that most of the students in this category did not object to JROTC's physical training component.) Others joined because friends or family members recommended the program, and still others simply wanted a challenge.

Opinions about JROTC classroom instruction ranged from boring to exciting, but it was generally regarded as successful. The students seemed to want the teacher to be a mentor and preferred interesting, relevant class discussions and hands-on learning outside the classroom as opposed to book learning. What they liked most about JROTC included the opportunity for self-improvement, the skills and subjects they were learning, and the activities that brought camaraderie. Complaints included getting up early, allegations of favoritism and abuse of authority, poor-quality uniform fabric, and push-ups.

Washington, D.C.

Background

Field research was also conducted in the Washington, D.C., City Public School System (DCPS), one of the country's most embattled and high-profile school systems. DCPS reported a SY 1997–1998 enrollment of 77,111 students (including 14,416 senior high school students). Of the system's 18 senior high schools, 13 have JROTC units (10 army, 2 navy, 1 air force; there are no marine corps units). Like Chicago, Washington has a considerable history of military-sponsored programs. However, the city's JROTC units have been continuously active only since the mid-1970s.

Quantitative Measures of Effectiveness

The army maintains a DAI within DCPS that collects and reports data on the city's army JROTC units. This DAI operates similarly to its Chicago counterpart but is much smaller in scope and size (three employees). It also does not follow the air force or navy units that instead report directly to their respective service headquarters. This appears to be the operating norm across the country.

DCPS DAI tracks JROTC enrollment, dropouts, suspensions, average daily attendance, post-high-school plans, graduation rates, subsequent senior ROTC and military enlistment, scholarship awards, and academic scores, but does not break down data by gender or ethnicity.

According to DAI data, in SY 1996–1997 the 1,540 JROTC members compared with the 8,967 students in the total school population had a higher average GPA (2.32 vs. 2.19), SAT score (754 vs. 745), and daily attendance rate (83 percent vs. 63 percent). Moreover JROTC members had lower dropout (2 percent vs. 4 percent) and suspension (3 percent vs. 8 percent) rates.

Of 1,747 seniors, 111 were JROTC cadets. Some 28 percent of these senior cadets were enlisting in the active and reserve components of the military (a figure slightly lower than nationally reported percentages). Nearly identical percentages of senior cadets and the overall senior class were college-bound (41 percent vs. 40 percent). Curiously, DAI reports that the senior cadets received no service scholarships but did receive 36 non-DOD scholarships. According to DAI data, 3 cadets had been accepted into military service academies and 11 cadets were to enroll in senior ROTC programs.

The foregoing analysis of Washington, D.C., although perhaps rudimentary and not extensively bolstered by student survey responses (see appendix C), clearly reflects an army JROTC program that delivers meaningful value to its enrollees.

El Paso, Texas

Because the El Paso Independent School District provided only summary statistics (from six high schools for SY 1993–1994 through 1996–1997) for GPAs, absences, infractions, college-bound rates, and SAT scores, no statistical analyses were performed for this city. As in Chicago, we set out to follow a single cohort each of JROTC and non-JROTC students by looking at data on SY 1993–1994 freshmen, 1994–1995 sophomores, 1995–1996 juniors, and 1996–1997 seniors. See table 3.4.⁴²

JROTC students actually had lower average GPAs than their non-JROTC counterparts in all four years. The GPAs of both groups improved with time, however, and in the senior year the gap was less than 1 GPA point out of a 100-point scale.

JROTC students had higher average attendance rates than their non-JROTC peers in their freshman and sophomore years, nearly identical attendance rates in their junior year, and lower attendance rates in their senior year.

JROTC students had fewer infractions on average for all school years. However, the numbers are nearly identical in the senior year, a result consistent with the higher numbers of absences for both groups during that year.

42. As in the case of Chicago, analysis at the beginning of this time frame did not include the city's air force program, which did not begin operations until 1994–1995.

Table 3.4: El Paso JROTC vs. Non-JROTC Cohorts

| | 1993–1994 | 1994–1995 | 1995–1996 | 1996–1997 |
|---------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| JROTC Students | 206 | 145 | 83 | 82 |
| Average GPA* | 74.60 | 80.70 | 82.70 | 83.50 |
| Average Absences | 8.27 | 7.50 | 8.54 | 12.77 |
| Average Infractions | 2.30 | 1.80 | 1.50 | 1.55 |
| Non-JROTC Students | 3175 | 2374 | 1720 | 1868 |
| Average GPA* | 77.70 | 81.70 | 84.30 | 84.30 |
| Average Absences | 8.99 | 8.37 | 8.56 | 11.31 |
| Average Infractions | 2.80 | 2.10 | 1.80 | 1.62 |

* 90–100 = A; 80–89 = B; 75–79 = C; 70–74 = D.

The El Paso summary data on college-bound rates and average SAT scores for JROTC and non-JROTC seniors are in table 3.5. Note the marked improvement in SAT scores and college-bound rates for both the JROTC and the non-JROTC groups between SY 1995–1996 and 1996–1997. We have no explanation for this other than to note the effectiveness of the El Paso Independent School District as we observed it.

Table 3.5: El Paso JROTC vs. Non-JROTC Seniors

| | 1993–1994 | 1994–1995 | 1995–1996 | 1996–1997 |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| JROTC Seniors | 57 | 69 | 75 | 82 |
| College Bound (%) | 45 | 42 | 43 | 63 |
| Average SAT Scores | * | * | 854 | 940 |
| Non-JROTC Seniors | 1413 | 1380 | 1314 | 1868 |
| College Bound (%) | 51 | 57 | 55 | 67 |
| Average SAT Scores | * | * | 888 | 949 |

* The El Paso Independent School District supplied SAT data only for SY 1995–1996 and 1996–1997.

Conclusions

Our overall finding is that JROTC benefits a significant segment of our nation's youth and their communities. Many of our recommendations are designed to ensure that all communities and schools share in what JROTC has to offer. Although we agree that disadvantaged youth often gain the most from JROTC, the program must remain an attractive option for all sectors of the nation's youth to retain and enhance its democratic character.

Why JROTC Matters

Policymakers and the nation must recognize that the federal government has a moral obligation to sustain JROTC regardless of the extent to which it directly benefits the national defense. It strengthens the nation, our communities, and our youth as well as the military. The program should be expanded steadily and provided with the requisite resources. A sufficient number of communities want and need additional JROTC units to justify such an overall policy direction (see waiting list data at the end of appendix A).

Billions of dollars are spent on the development of our youth, with a majority of cabinet agencies involved. Clearly, the federal government has long considered such expenditures a priority. Yet, without a stronger policy commitment and more funding, the JROTC programs of the four military services will be forced to reduce numbers of units to be able to maintain standards, update curricula, respond to local contingencies, respond to educational challenges, and utilize technological advancements. Current funding levels do not allow any service to field the maximum number of units that Congress has authorized.

In the climate generated by pronounced reductions in defense spending during the 1990s, it is tempting to view a program such as JROTC as nonessential to defense and to reduce its funding and staffing. Such a choice would be shortsighted, however, given the serious implications of the growing divergence between this country's military and civilian cultures. Because fewer citizens (including policymakers) have direct knowledge of the roles of the military, support for a robust national defense is waning. JROTC is one of a dwindling set of tools that can help the military forge a closer connection to civil society. This connection comes not only through the knowledge and values conveyed in JROTC classrooms but also through the countless positive examples provided by the young people that the program helps shape into productive members of their communities. This, rather than JROTC's effect on recruitment, is the program's main benefit to the military. For this reason alone, the mission and operations of JROTC enhance national security.

When we question the future of JROTC, we must consider resources. Although defense outlays appear to be on the upswing, beginning with the FY 1999 appropriation, we must not view the JROTC program simply as one more defense constituency clamoring for a larger share of the pie. It benefits not only DOD but also the programs of many other disparate federal agencies. The relatively modest cost of a program whose proven benefits reach far and wide is a persuasive argument for its expansion.

JROTC Is not Anti-Individualistic

Many of those opposed to JROTC enter the debate with the preconception that hierarchical military values discourage the individualism crucial to the U.S. democratic culture. Such a perspective on military values, and by extension the values JROTC attempts to inculcate, is far too narrow. Although adherence to chains of command and respect for authority are essential in a profession whose activities can be lethal, the military does not need or want blind submission to authority. The armed forces look to the nation's traditions of individual initiative and selfless service. Civilian society also relies on a balance between respect for authority and individualism. Few would argue that our society could function without respect for the law and some space for individual creativity and initiative.

The real question is one of distinguishing legitimate from destructive authority. Such a distinction contains a moral dimension and presupposes shared values. In the process of choosing its role models, society also struggles to achieve a consensus on its own values. Often these battles are fought in the field of education, the primary social institution for transmitting the values that society considers most important. JROTC has been the object of so many fervent commentaries, pro and con, because it evokes all the tensions resident in the nation's experience.

Although citizens may disagree about which values are right, it is essential for our heterogeneous society—which lacks the ties of a single shared ethnicity or religion—to develop and maintain a shared sense of identity. JROTC acknowledges this imperative through the objectives it pursues, the foremost of which are citizenship and patriotism. Far from being anti-individualistic, JROTC seeks to nurture individualism in the service of a common cause.

Recommendations

Continue to expand JROTC's presence in inner cities. The JROTC expansion in the mid-1990s gave priority to establishing new units in inner cities. The policy allowed urban schools to pay less than the standard share of program costs for the first few years of a new unit's operation (see appendix A). Our observations support the belief that JROTC is especially beneficial in inner-city environments, and we therefore recommend that future expansions continue this focus. Some critics argue that JROTC is primarily a military recruitment device and that its emphasis on relatively disadvantaged urban areas simply enables JROTC to target a segment of youth with fewer choices in life. However, such critics ignore the fact that the basic mission of JROTC is not recruitment but promoting good citizenship, responsibility, leadership, and personal accomplishment on the part of high school students—all of which can provide them with more choices.

Insist that DOD guarantee that the funds intended for JROTC program management are used for this specific purpose. The leadership of the four military services and in DOD must insist that funds intended for JROTC program management not be siphoned off by intervening upper-level headquarters. All the JROTC program headquarters of the services informed us that by the time their allotted funding reached them, it was less than the original amount. In the army and navy programs, it was significantly less. If allowed to continue, this state of affairs will not bode well for the future health of JROTC.

Permit reservists and part-time National Guard members to serve as JROTC instructors. The quality of local instructors is crucial to the success of any JROTC unit, but continued DOD downsizing combined with a strong national economy is likely to decrease the number of qualified military retirees available to serve in schools. In many inner-city areas, finding qualified instructors is already difficult.

One solution is to permit military reservists and part-time members of the National Guard to be candidates for the instructor force. They tend to be close to communities with JROTC programs. Many also have or have had full-time instructional experience in high schools and colleges. Already, through partnership with America's Promise, the services have provided active and reserve personnel to mentor disadvantaged youths in public schools—an arrangement that should be expanded. If the services consider reserve and guard personnel qualified to represent them as mentors, they should also permit them to serve as full-time JROTC instructors.

This solution has been proposed in the past and rejected because of expense, but it need not be prohibitively expensive. By creating a separate accounting category for

these instructors, DOD would not have to bear the expense that current formulas for instructor pay require.

Encourage and expand informal coordination between service managers at the national level and between instructors at the regional and the local levels. We considered many alternatives for improving the overall structure of JROTC management, including giving more authority to DOD oversight, moving program management to the National Guard, or moving it entirely to another government agency. In the end, based primarily on the debate at our conference at Cantigny, we determined that the best course of action is to let the present management structure continue the clear trend of improvement. Growth of communications between and cooperation among the program management staffs of the services should be encouraged.

Our intention in looking at the management structure was to ensure that curriculum development, unit placement, instructor certification, and other functions of JROTC national management are performed at maximum effectiveness and minimal cost. After extensive examination of these issues at our Cantigny conference, and follow-up meetings and correspondence, we conclude that management-overhaul costs would significantly exceed the benefits envisaged. Service identities engendered locally are best achieved with the current management structure, while the services maintain their vested interest in the program—a result that no other agency (including DOD) could achieve.

The bottom line is that JROTC management is inherently dispersed. It resides in service headquarters as well as in hundreds of school systems and thousands of schools across the country. To increase effectiveness within this structure, regular coordination and communication at every level are crucial. Today many instructors have no opportunity to share experiences and ideas with their fellow instructors at other schools. Instructor associations, such as the one that brings together instructors in Prince George's County, Md., can be a valuable forum for exchanging ideas and helping to resolve resource problems by allowing local units to pool scarce items. In many larger school systems with multiple JROTC units, central administrative units—the DAIs in Chicago, Washington, and El Paso—often fulfill this role of coordination. Regardless of how it is accomplished, such coordination must continue and expand.

Encourage Congress to take the lead in establishing priorities for the future of JROTC. In the early 1990s, Congress mandated an expansion that almost doubled the size of the JROTC program. It is still the only entity with the authority to require further substantial change. Key congressional leaders with reputations for bipartisanship should lead an initiative, based on this report, to legislate the following:

- Establishment of an interagency task force to find strategic partnerships among the dispersed federal youth development programs.
- Further JROTC expansion to accommodate at least the existing local demand for new units, with budget authority to carry it out.
- Requirement for mission standardization among the four military services.

Legislative effort must not be limited by these suggestions, however. A sustained plan for the future of JROTC will require the leadership and commitment of our national policymakers.

Forge links to nongovernmental organizations involved in youth community service. A new model for fostering youth development in the communities most in need has been developed by organizations such as America's Promise, building on the President's Volunteer Summit and following the lead and aims of the Corporation for National Service. The idea is that both the public and the private sectors play a role in ensuring that young people have the tools to build the skills and character necessary to prosper. They are able to channel the philanthropic impulses of the business community toward this end and to match organizations to the varying needs of local communities. America's Promise identifies five core resources required for successful youth development:

- an ongoing relationship with a caring adult (mentor, tutor, coach),
- safe places and structured activities during nonschool hours to learn and grow,
- a healthy start and healthy future,
- a marketable skill through effective education,
- an opportunity to give back through community service.⁴³

These goals closely correspond to those of JROTC. JROTC and service organizations can best help each other through an integration of community service efforts. JROTC students can provide positive examples and serve as junior mentors to younger children. In turn, JROTC students could be offered more and better service opportunities. We heard countless times from educators during our field research that, once students are in high school, it is too late to reach many of them. Although the proposed solution that we heard most often was to extend JROTC into junior high or even elementary schools, this would be infeasible, in part owing to cost. The cycle that puts many of our nation's young people at risk can be broken by providing avenues for them to help one another.

Some links already exist between America's Promise and the military services, for example, opportunities for volunteer work by reserve or active service members. However, JROTC students are underutilized or poorly utilized in community-based activities. America's Promise and other organizations can help match them with appropriate and beneficial service opportunities. JROTC should establish official organizational links with such groups.

Offer incentives to JROTC students to perform nonmilitary as well as military national service. Currently, students who graduate from high school having completed the four-year JROTC program can enter military service with enhanced pay and rank. JROTC students should be offered comparable privileges for enlisting in one of the AmeriCorps programs of the Corporation for National Service (CNS).

43. America's Promise <<http://www.americaspromise.org>>.

CNS programs offer a voucher for further education to participants who complete a one-year term, but this incentive is modest compared with the educational benefits offered by the military to its enlistees. In addition to helping JROTC fulfill its mission of encouraging good citizenship, such a national service incentive would also enable the military to refute the common criticism that JROTC is primarily a recruitment vehicle. Admittedly, encouraging young people to participate in civilian forms of service might affect the ability of the military to recruit highly qualified individuals, but the trade-off would be the ability to present young people with a wide range of service opportunities. And it would help ground JROTC into a national program of service.

Encourage JROTC and local school systems to develop guidelines cooperatively to ensure that community service activities do not inadvertently undercut other priorities. The National Education Goals Panel, a national project to establish educational priorities and standards, has urged that “all students...be involved in activities that promote and demonstrate good citizenship,...community service, and personal responsibility.”⁴⁴ Many school systems throughout the United States are beginning to require students to participate in some form of community service to graduate. Service to community and to nation creates awareness of how society functions and fosters a consciousness of social problems that need to be solved.

JROTC is often heavily involved in community service at the local level. In most cases, the community service is productive and connects the students in a meaningful way to their communities. Most students in the schools we visited also indicated to us that they enjoyed the community service, it did not detract from their schoolwork, and they were eager to do more. This suggests to us that the various JROTC headquarters need to reach a mutual understanding with local school systems on the purposes of local service and to develop guidelines on program implementation.

Make JROTC sensitive to local concerns relating to education, while ensuring that students who want to are able to enroll in JROTC. In many cases, increasing school requirements for graduation means that many students just cannot find time to participate in JROTC. In the near future some schools may have to drop JROTC altogether if not enough students are able to fit it into their schedules. The problem is already acute for college-bound and honors students. One solution that some states have agreed to is to allow substitute credit for core courses that the JROTC curriculum parallels closely. With little if any modification, JROTC could (and in some states does) substitute for courses such as physical education, health, social studies, and government. In many more progressive states, logging demonstrated competence in a subject rather than hours spent in class is being implemented. But without more support and encouragement from state departments of education, this change will not be fully realized.

JROTC must also respond to other current concerns such as the controversy over rifles on school property. Given recent school shootings, local communities must be reassured that JROTC policy does not require rifle training. Although marine corps

44. National Education Goals Panel, “Goal Three: Student Achievement and Citizenship” <<http://www.negp.gov>>.

JROTC requires classroom instruction in marksmanship (actually handling rifles is optional), the army includes such training only in schools that support it, and it is not in the curricula of the navy and the air force at all. When marksmanship is taught, it is meant to promote concentration, discipline, attention to detail, coordination, teamwork, safety, etc.—all of which contribute to overall JROTC objectives. It is akin more to the Olympic sport than to military training.

In sum, regardless of its good intentions, JROTC must be cognizant of the needs of individual communities and the imperatives of the overall national educational environment.

History of JROTC

For the first five decades of its history, JROTC was solely a program of the U.S. Army. JROTC (along with another program for secondary-school-age youth, NDCC) was established under the terms of the National Defense Act of 1916. The primary purpose of both programs during the early years was the dissemination of military knowledge and values among the U.S. secondary-school population. Consequently, active-duty army officers were detailed as professors and assistant professors of military science.

JROTC students received three hours of general military instruction a week for three years. Schools hosting JROTC detachments were provided with rifles, belts, small amounts of ammunition, instructional materials, and uniforms. JROTC was—and still is—considered the equivalent of the first year of senior ROTC's senior basic course.

Approximately 45,000 students enrolled in JROTC when it was under way in SY 1919–1920. Enrollment rose slowly over the next two decades and stood at approximately 72,000 by 1942.

From 1947 until enactment of the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, the Department of the Army prevented further JROTC expansion because of personnel shortages and inability to meet the various costs of the unit. In 1963 (a year in which some 700 active-duty personnel were needed to run JROTC at a cost of \$4.7 million), Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered a reevaluation of defense spending including JROTC. Because NDCC had the same objectives as JROTC but cost less than \$100,000 per year to operate, the decision was made to cut JROTC funding drastically. Funds were requested only to sustain JROTC units in high schools with a distinctly military curriculum and to convert JROTC units to NDCC units. (In the end, however, the NDCC program never was as widely accepted as JROTC, in large part because NDCC required schools to pay for items whose costs would have been shared with the federal government under JROTC.)

Immediately following McNamara's announcement, DOD received more than 300 disapproving letters and telegrams from members of Congress (including House Armed Services Committee chairman F. Edward Hebert), heads of educational institutions, and individual citizens. Legislation to expand JROTC was introduced in the House of Representatives. During the hearings on this bill, DOD proposed that all JROTC and NDCC units be studied to survey the needs and preferences of a cross section of high schools. Pending completion of the study, DOD agreed to continue JROTC through FY 1964.

An ad hoc committee of 11 members (9 of whom were from the military) met daily from April 30 to June 7, 1963. The special committee reported that JROTC as currently operated by the army had successfully met its limited objectives and that any

attempt to eliminate the program would bring renewed public protest. It also reported that there was substantial national interest in the continuation and expansion of JROTC (but not NDCC, because of the lack of direct army personnel support or provision of subsidies and uniforms for it).

Although JROTC and NDCC provided only marginal benefits (the creation of favorable attitudes toward military service) from the military's point of view, the report asserted that encouraging better citizenship on the part of high school students through a disciplined military training program was a national requirement. This conclusion was based on a survey of authorities of secondary-school systems, community leaders, and parents that gave unmistakable support to the continuation and expansion of JROTC as a necessary addition to the typical high school curriculum.

The report recommended legislation to authorize participation by the other military services in an expanded JROTC program. To avert a drain on active-duty personnel, selected retired personnel hired by the schools and paid federally subsidized salaries would provide instruction.

Public Law 88-647 (the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964) in many ways reflected the DOD report recommendations. It required the secretary of each military department to establish and maintain JROTC units, which were to be distributed in a geographically equitable way (i.e., not limited to the areas in which JROTC had historically been most popular—the southeastern United States and locales near large military bases).

Participating schools were required to provide adequate facilities and to offer at least a three-year course of military instruction. Course membership was limited to students who maintained academic and disciplinary standards acceptable to the military. Both active-duty officers and retired officers were to be used as administrators and instructors. The services were required to provide necessary course text materials, equipment, and uniforms and to establish minimum performance standards for their respective units.

The navy, air force, and marine corps JROTC programs (whose major elements were modeled after the established army program) quickly began to take shape. Several program elements established at that time remain today; for example, each service curriculum established a mix of classroom instruction and summer training programs. (Summer camp training is an optional part of the program for the approximately 10 percent of students who assume unit leadership positions. Typically, camps take place at a nearby base or installation and last one to two weeks.)

After the 1964 legislation was enacted, the president asked the secretary of defense to conduct a thorough study of JROTC to determine whether it could be made responsive to the needs of national defense and still be conducted at the lowest possible cost. The recommendations of the DOD study group were codified in a 1965 DOD directive whose key points included the following:

- To make JROTC more supportive of army recruitment, credit was authorized for those junior cadets entering the senior ROTC or enlisting in the armed forces. Graduates of the JROTC program were to receive credit for no less than the first year of senior ROTC if they enrolled in that program in college or advanced promotion at least to the grade of E-2 (private) on initial enlistment if they joined the army.

- To promote basic technical training for prospective military recruits, a two-track curriculum was adopted by JROTC—an academic track for students planning to enter college and a technical track combining military instruction with technical courses with a military application.

The number of army JROTC units more than doubled in the decade following passage of the ROTC Vitalization Act. By SY 1973–1974, however, the Vietnam War and the end of conscription had put new pressure on military education in secondary schools. The army undertook to make its JROTC program more appealing to a high school population that had become suspicious of the military. Junior cadets were authorized to enlist in the regular army in advanced grades ranging from E-2 (private) through E-4 (corporal), depending on their performance and experience in JROTC. Qualified graduates were given a special honors category for a military-academy nomination. In the wake of a 1972 court ruling declaring the exclusion of females from JROTC to be discriminatory, students of both genders were permitted to enroll.

In July 1976 President Ford signed Public Law 94-361, which raised the total authorized number of JROTC units from 1,200 to 1,600. The army was granted 200 of the new units, to be established at the rate of 50 per year. Owing to a lack of funding, however, only 20 additional JROTC units were established before 1980, when Congress passed Public Law 96-342. This law was intended to encourage JROTC expansion by lowering the minimum required number of cadets per unit from 100 to any amount not less than 10 percent of the number of students registered at the host school. The army then decided to complete the 1976 JROTC expansion plan. In SY 1983–1984 through 1985–1986, it enlarged its JROTC program by some 60 units per year, bringing the total close to the maximum permitted number.

The focus on rapid expansion led the army to neglect timely updates in operations. Before the creation of the U.S. Army's Cadet Command in 1986, the administration of JROTC was both decentralized and unsystematic. Because management of the program was a low priority, it was spread across the many separate bureaucratic levels of the senior ROTC program. The rapid expansion of JROTC in the early 1980s overwhelmed the management capabilities of the regional headquarters staffs at a time when the federal government was coming under increasing budgetary constraint.

In response to these problems, the army's training and doctrine bureaucracy conducted a detailed review of JROTC and developed the Junior ROTC Improvement Plan (JRIP), which envisaged the following enhancements:

- upgrading the program's image by improving cadet appearance and discipline and by funding summer camps;
- enriching instructor cadre quality, appearance, and performance by clarifying and strengthening the process of instructor decertification and by implementing training programs and annual appraisals by the army;
- improving JROTC management by establishing a program evaluation plan, evolving a computerized management information system, and contracting for the development of training material.

The standardization of an educational system encompassing almost 900 high schools and 135,000 cadets required a primary staff section at the decisionmaking

level of command. Accordingly, a new high school directorate was created to standardize and regulate policy throughout the vast army JROTC community. The organizational structure of the new staff section included an operations branch (later division) to monitor all educational activities. By December 1987 the functions of the directorate had evolved into preparing plans and regulations, developing curricula, and monitoring budget and personnel requirements for the entire junior program.

Under the organizational wing of Cadet Command, the army's JROTC program was expanded and improved throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. By autumn 1992 the program had 2,100 instructors and a presence in 44 states as well as locations abroad.

In the wake of the 1992 Los Angeles riots, President Bush and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, unveiled a bold new initiative to help the country's youth. They presented Cadet Command with perhaps the biggest challenge of its short history: to double the size of the JROTC program within five years. At the same time, the other services, with much younger programs, were equally challenged.

The FY 1993 National Defense Authorization Act authorized an increase in the maximum allowable number of JROTC units from 1,600 to 3,500 but did not address the question of funding. That issue was left to the discretion of DOD and the individual services, each of which significantly increased the size and scope of its program despite difficulties in recruiting well-qualified retired commissioned and noncommissioned officers to fill the additional instructor slots. Unfortunately, JROTC funding in each service was subject to review at several administrative levels, each of which could assess costs and subtract corresponding amounts before the money reached JROTC headquarters.

Although the new legislation authorized as many as 3,500 JROTC units, to conserve resources, the services aimed at the more modest target of 2,900 units originally proposed by President Bush. This plan was approved by the secretary of defense.

The pre-expansion JROTC program totaled 1,481 units, with 1,452 located in the United States and the remaining 29 in U.S. territories, trust properties, and overseas DOD-dependent schools. The strongest JROTC presence was in a crescent-shaped area stretching from Texas to the Gulf coast, through the southeastern United States, and up the mid-Atlantic region to Maryland. The five states with the most units (amounting to approximately 40 percent of total unit strength) were Texas (167), Florida (120), California (150), North Carolina (100), and Georgia (90). Because unit placement was always a function of local school demand, the overrepresentation of these areas simply reflected the lack of a coherent plan on the part of DOD or the services to ensure geographic balance.

In the wake of the 1993 legislation, placing units in areas where JROTC was underrepresented received more attention: the northern plains, the populous northeast, and especially New England. States with few or no JROTC units were Montana (0), Vermont (1), South Dakota (1), Oregon (1), and 6 states with 2 units each (Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire, and North Dakota). In table A.1 the expansion is summarized by region.

According to the original expansion estimates, 63 units (combined services) were projected to begin operation in SY 1992–1993, 466 in 1993–1994, and the remaining 890 in 1994–1995, for a total of 1,419 new units. In actuality, each service needed

additional time to field its new units, through SY 1996 -1997. The total number of new units established during the expansion period amounted to 1,103—less than 80 percent of the planned number.

Table A.1: JROTC Regional Growth Trends

| Region | Units in 1992 | Units in 1996 | Percent Increase |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| New England | 23 | 55 | 139 |
| Overseas | 29 | 62 | 113 |
| Mid-Atlantic | 70 | 137 | 95 |
| West North Central | 53 | 103 | 94 |
| Pacific | 135 | 253 | 87 |
| South Atlantic | 491 | 886 | 80 |
| West South Central | 253 | 415 | 64 |
| East South Central | 204 | 326 | 59 |
| Mountain | 88 | 138 | 56 |
| East North Central | 135 | 209 | 55 |
| Total | 1,481 | 2,584 | 74 |

Despite the shortfall in numbers of new units, the services were somewhat more successful in some other areas. Before the mid-1990s expansion, the services had established JROTC units in 409 inner-city schools, representing 28 percent of all units. The army had the most inner-city units (272), followed by the navy (86), the air force (32), and the marine corps (19). The five states with the most inner-city units were California (63), Texas (54), Illinois (31), Alabama (31), and Tennessee (29). Increasing JROTC presence in inner-city schools was a primary goal during the expansion: 515 (47 percent) of the 1,103 new units were started in urban areas (defined as cities with populations greater than 150,000), for a postexpansion total of 924 inner-city units (accounting for some 36 percent of all units). After completion of the expansion program, the five states with the most inner-city units were Texas (124 units), California (96), Florida (65), Georgia (51), and Maryland (42).

The FY 1993 JROTC legislation authorized the secretaries of the military departments to assist schools financially in economically or educationally disadvantaged areas. The assistance was in the form of a five-year period of support covering a greater-than-usual proportion of instructor salaries (e.g., full instructor funding for two years, 75 percent funding for three years, and the normal 50 percent share thereafter). In the majority of cases in which schools entered into such an agreement, the schools did not abandon JROTC when the special assistance ended. In SY 1995–1996, at the height of expansion activity, all services participated in assisting disadvantaged schools (predominantly located in inner cities) to establish JROTC units,

investing nearly \$9 million for at-risk youth. Funding assistance was provided to 324 poorer schools, 187 of which were helped by the army, 81 by the navy, 49 by the air force, and 7 by the marine corps.

In 1992 a large number of schools were on service waiting lists to receive the next available JROTC units. Being first in line, they were promptly awarded new units during the expansion. Today the service waiting lists continue to grow, even past pre-expansion levels. See table A.2.

All services are currently consolidating their programs and in many ways continue to improve them. The overall number of units has remained relatively steady, with the president's FY 1999 budget and FY 2000 request calling for little change.

Table A.2: Schools on Waiting Lists for JROTC Units

| Service | 1992 | 1996 | 1998 |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Army | 95 | 111 | 181 |
| Navy | 120 | 59 | 131 |
| Air Force | 28 | 77 | 118 |
| Marine Corps | 21 | 17 | 26 |
| Total | 264 | 264 | 456 |

Survey of 28 JROTC Senior Instructors in Chicago

| Questions | Responses | | |
|--|--------------------|----|-----|
| How long have you been the Senior Instructor or Instructor at this high school? | Less than 1 year | 4 | 14% |
| | Less than 5 years | 14 | 50% |
| | Less than 10 years | 4 | 14% |
| | More than 10 years | 6 | 21% |
| What is your opinion of the content of the curriculum provided by JROTC? | Excellent | 22 | 79% |
| | Good | 6 | 21% |
| | Fair | 0 | |
| | Poor | 0 | |
| How well do the resources provided by your Service meet your needs to conduct a vibrant and successful program? | Excellent | 13 | 46% |
| | Good | 12 | 43% |
| | Fair | 3 | 11% |
| | Poor | 0 | |
| How well do resources provided by your Public School System meet your needs to conduct a vibrant and successful program? | Excellent | 9 | 32% |
| | Good | 15 | 54% |
| | Fair | 2 | 7% |
| | Poor | 2 | 7% |
| How well do you think the mission of JROTC is being met by your program? | Excellent | 20 | 71% |
| | Good | 5 | 18% |
| | Fair | 3 | 11% |
| | Poor | 0 | |
| How well has the traditional instructional approach of JROTC addressed the learning requirements of your students? | Excellent | 11 | 39% |
| | Good | 16 | 57% |
| | Fair | 1 | 4% |
| | Poor | 0 | |

| Questions | Responses | | |
|---|------------------|----|-----|
| How well has the performance-based instruction approach of JROTC addressed the learning requirement of your students? | Excellent | 20 | 71% |
| | Good | 7 | 25% |
| | Fair | 1 | 4% |
| | Poor | 0 | |

Surveys of JROTC Students in Three Cities

| Questions | Responses | | | | | |
|---|--------------|-----|------------|------|------------|-----|
| | Chicago | | Washington | | El Paso | |
| Why did you join JROTC? | | | | | | |
| New experience | 497 | 30% | 4 | 22% | 47 | 28% |
| Interested in military, curious about program | 408 | 25% | 2 | 11% | 59 | 36% |
| Required subject | 123 | 7% | 2 | 11% | 0 | |
| For the discipline/leadership | 205 | 12% | 3 | 17% | 13 | 8% |
| Family or friends encouraged | 160 | 10% | 1 | 6% | 23 | 14% |
| Self-improvement, challenge | 202 | 12% | 4 | 22% | 19 | 12% |
| Other | 60 | 4% | 2 | 11% | 4 | 2% |
| Total | 1,655 | | 18 | | 165 | |
| I plan to take JROTC next year. | | | | | | |
| True | 1,281 | 84% | 18 | 100% | 141 | 85% |
| False | 247 | 16% | 0 | | 25 | 15% |
| Total | 1,528 | | 18 | | 166 | |
| I participate in JROTC summer camp. | | | | | | |
| True | 375 | 23% | 4 | 22% | 41 | 26% |
| False | 1,257 | 77% | 14 | 78% | 117 | 74% |
| Total | 1,632 | | 18 | | 158 | |
| I would participate in group events after school or on weekends with JROTC. | | | | | | |
| True | 1,208 | 73% | 16 | 89% | 139 | 84% |
| False | 446 | 27% | 2 | 11% | 27 | 16% |
| Total | 1,654 | | 18 | | 166 | |

| Questions | Responses | | | | | |
|---|--------------|-----|------------|-----|------------|-----|
| | Chicago | | Washington | | El Paso | |
| I would recommend JROTC to a close friend. | | | | | | |
| True | 1,443 | 86% | 15 | 83% | 158 | 95% |
| False | 232 | 14% | 3 | 17% | 8 | 5% |
| Total | 1,675 | | 18 | | 166 | |
| I think I will graduate from high school with a diploma. | | | | | | |
| True | 1,655 | 98% | 17 | 94% | 163 | 98% |
| False | 31 | 2% | 1 | 6% | 3 | 2% |
| Total | 1,686 | | 18 | | 166 | |
| I plan to take college courses after high school. | | | | | | |
| True | 1,495 | 90% | 15 | 83% | 146 | 88% |
| False | 170 | 10% | 3 | 17% | 20 | 12% |
| Total | 1,665 | | 18 | | 166 | |
| If you indicated you planned to attend college, please answer A True if you think you will participate in Senior ROTC at the college level, B False if you do not plan to take Senior ROTC. | | | | | | |
| True | 904 | 60% | 10 | 77% | 104 | 71% |
| False | 609 | 40% | 3 | 23% | 43 | 29% |
| Total | 1,513 | | 13 | | 147 | |
| I plan to join one of the military services, active or Reserve, after high school. | | | | | | |
| True | 720 | 44% | 7 | 39% | 105 | 63% |
| False | 909 | 56% | 11 | 61% | 61 | 37% |
| Total | 1,629 | | 18 | | 166 | |
| What are your goals after high school? | | | | | | |
| College | 1,066 | 69% | 9 | 50% | 82 | 51% |
| Active-Duty Military | 246 | 16% | 2 | 11% | 50 | 31% |
| Work | 44 | 3% | 1 | 6% | 13 | 8% |
| College and Senior ROTC | 23 | 1% | 1 | 6% | 9 | 6% |
| Tech/Trade school | 52 | 3% | 2 | 11% | 2 | 1% |
| Reserves/guard | 29 | 2% | 0 | | 0 | |
| Other | 91 | 6% | 3 | 17% | 5 | 3% |
| Total | 1,551 | | 18 | | 161 | |

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